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I. INTRODUCTION: CASE-WITHIN-A-CASE
As literary devices, a “story-within-a story” and a “play-within-a-
play” have a long lineage.1  Shakespeare seems to have been particularly 
fond of these devices.2  The legal analog may be seen as the “case-
* Giles Sutherland Rich Professor in Intellectual Property, University of Akron School of Law.  I 
would like to thank Dean Martin Belsky and Associate Dean William Jordon, University of Akron 
School of Law, for the grant of release time to undertake the completion of this article.  I would also 
like to thank Kyle Passmore, Deputy Law Librarian, University of Akron School of Law, for her 
valuable research assistance, and my research assistant, Angela Cox, J.D. 2013, University of Akron 
School of Law, for her dedicated assistance in the preparation of this article.  Finally, I would like to 
express my gratitude to my wife, Lorys Oddi, for her rigorous, but always helpful, editorial skills in 
reviewing numerous drafts of this article.   
 1. See, e.g., MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QUIXOTE: COMPLETE AND 
UNABRIDGED (Walter Starkie trans., Signet Classics, reprint ed. 2009); FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE 
BROTHERS KARAMAZOV (Andrew R. MacAndrew trans., Bantam Classics 1984); THOMAS KYD,
THE SPANISH TRAGEDY (Charles T. Prouty ed., Harlan Davidson 1951). 
 2. See Richard L. McGuire, The Play-within-the-play in 1 Henry IV, 18 SHAKESPEARE 
QUARTERLY 47, 47 (1967); see also, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMER NIGHT’S
DREAM (Simon & Schuster, reprint ed. 2004); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET (Cyrus Hoy ed., 
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within-a-case” (“trial-within-a-trial,” “suit-within-a-suit”) arising in 
legal malpractice cases.3  The case-within-a-case terminology seems to 
be the most commonly used and hence will be used herein.4  While it is 
clear that the “case” is the malpractice case,5 it is not so clear what the 
“case-within-” is,6 which is usually referred to as the “underlying case.”7
Often, it seems to be presumed that the underlying case is limited to 
W. W. Norton Co., 2d. ed. 1992); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW (Jonathan 
Bate and Eric Rasmussen eds., Modern Library, reprint ed. 2010).   
 3. See 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 36:12 (2011); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. b (2000); 
John H. Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice: An Appraisal of the Crumbling Dike and the 
Threatening Flood, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1127 (1988) (discussing problems of limiting damages 
according to the case-within-a-case methodology to failure to obtain a judgment rather than the 
actual harm resulting from the malpractice); Lawrence W. Kessler, Alternative Liability in 
Litigation Malpractice Actions:  Eradicating the Law Resort of Scoundrels, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
401 (2000) (examining the development of alternative duty and proof doctrines and advocating for 
the application of the various doctrines in legal malpractice actions); Joseph H. Koffler, Legal 
Malpractice Damages in Trial Within a Trial–A Critical Analysis of Unique Concepts:  Areas of 
Unconscionability, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 40 (1989) (discussing problems of fairness in applying the 
trial-within-a-trial doctrine in legal malpractice actions and making recommendations to eliminate 
the fairness problems); Adam J. Myers III, Misapplication of the Attorney Malpractice Paradigm to 
Litigation Services:  “Suit Within a Suit” Shortcomings Compel Witness Immunity for Experts, 25 
PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1997) (analyzing the application of the suit-within-a-suit doctrine in litigation 
services malpractice suits); Noreen L. Slank, Suit Within a Suit:  A Doctrine Michigan Courts Hate 
to Love, 72 MICH. B. J. 1174 (1993) (defending the suit-within-a-suit doctrine and classifying it as 
“the tort system’s most powerful predictor of the correct result in a wide variety of legal malpractice 
actions.”).  
 4. See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 36:6. 
 5. Malpractice will be used herein as the generic term with the understanding that the 
malpractice claim may be based on professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of 
contract, fraud, or other theory.  See 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 8:1:  
Most actions brought by clients against their attorneys are for negligence, fiduciary 
breach, breach of contract or fraud.  Although there are other theories, these bases of 
liability are familiar, usually easier to establish and provide full relief.  Debate about 
whether legal malpractice is based on contract or tort, and the nature of the tort, usually 
concerns application of a statute of limitations, or a statute providing a special remedy or 
damage recovery.  Because alternative theories often are based on the same factual 
allegations as a negligence cause of action, such claims frequently are treated as 
redundant and are disregarded.  In several jurisdictions, however, an action for legal 
malpractice, though sounding in tort, is an action in contract. (footnotes omitted) 
However, negligence will be referred to herein as the default theory in that it is the most commonly 
relied upon either solely or in combination of one or more of the other theories.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48 cmt. c (2000) (theories of liability: 
tort and contract), 49 (breach of fiduciary duty); see also A. Samuel Oddi, Patent Attorney 
Malpractice:  An Oxymoron No More, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1 (discussing the various 
elements and theories of malpractice cases involving patent attorneys). 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 21-35.     
 7. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 245 (9th ed. 2009) (“case-within-a-case rule.  Torts.  The 
requirement that a legal-malpractice-action plaintiff show that, but for the attorney’s negligence, the 
plaintiff would have won the case underlying the malpractice action.”). 
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litigation, which would have involved a trial culminating in a judgment 
being entered in favor of one of the parties.8  In many instances, 
litigation (real or hypothetical), indeed, is the source of the plaintiff’s 
injury and resulting damages as a consequence of an attorney’s 
malpractice.9  For example, if an attorney should miss a statute of 
limitations, thus barring the plaintiff from recovering against a party 
asserting the statute, the plaintiff must prove that, but for the negligence 
of its attorney, it would have prevailed against that party had the case 
been tried and gone to judgment.10
 8. See, e.g., Bebo Const. Co. v. Mattox O’Brien, P.C., 990 P.2d 78, 83 (Colo. 1999) (“The 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the claim underlying the malpractice action should have been 
successful if the attorney had acted in accordance with his or her duties.”). 
 9. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 1, 7, 12A (1965) provides separate definitions 
for “injury,” “harm,” “damages,” and “interest: 
§ 7 Injury and Harm 
 (1) The word “injury” is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the 
invasion of any legally protected interest of another. 
(2) The word “harm” is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the 
existence of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any cause. 
. . . 
12 A. Damages 
The word “damages” is used throughout the Restatement of this subject to denote a sum 
of money awarded to a person injured by the tort of another. 
§1. Interest 
The word “interest” is used throughout the Restatement of this subject to denote the 
object any human desire. 
Mallen & Smith, however, do not find these definitions useful, stating: 
  The terms “damages” and “injury” frequently are used interchangeably.  There is a 
difference, however, which can be important.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
defines “injury” as “the invasion of any legally protected interest of another” and 
“damages” as “a sum of money awarded to a person injured by the tort of another.”  
Using those definitions, damages are the monetary value of an injury.  The difference in 
meaning can be significant, if the issue concerns when a statute of limitations 
commences to run.  Often, the date of injury is earlier than the date when the damages 
are ascertainable or fully developed. 
  The Restatement’s general tort definition of “injury” is vague for use in the context 
of legal malpractice claims.  A more useful and precise definition for a legal malpractice 
injury is the loss of a right, remedy or interest, or the imposition of a liability.  Damages 
concern the measure of that injury. 
1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 21.1 (footnotes omitted).  The Restatement (Third) of the Law: 
The Law Governing Lawyers, appears to use the terms “injury” and “damages” interchangeably.  
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 48 (2000) (using 
“injury within the meaning of § 53,” with § 53 referring to “injury, as determined under generally 
applicable principles of causation and damages.”).  For convenience, the terms “injury” and 
“damages” will be used interchangeably herein unless otherwise indicated.   
 10. See, e.g., Basset v. Sheehan, 184 P.3d 1072, 1077 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (granting 
summary judgment in favor of defendant firm, where plaintiff was unable to show that it would 
have prevailed against underlying defendant if the statute of limitations for the underlying claim had 
not been missed).   
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On the other hand, there are many situations where clients are 
injured due to the malpractice of attorneys that do not involve being 
denied a favorable judgment in litigation.11  An example of this in the 
context of patent law would be the negligent failure of a patent attorney 
to file a patent application on behalf of a client in a timely manner to 
avoid a statutory bar.12  This situation obviously does not involve 
litigation; nonetheless, the client has suffered the loss of a patent if it can 
be established that a patent would have been granted but for the failure 
of the attorney to file the application in a timely manner.13  If no patent 
would have been granted (e.g., because of prior art), the plaintiff would 
be unable to establish a causal connection between the attorney’s 
negligence and any damage suffered.14  On the other hand, even if the 
patent would have been granted, plaintiff will still have to establish in 
the malpractice case that it suffered damages—perhaps in the form of 
loss of infringement damages or license royalties.15
When the malpractice plaintiff has suffered injury in the form of 
loss of a favorable judgment as a consequence of the malpractice of its 
attorney, this type of case-within-a-case will be termed herein as the 
“judgment” model.16  According to this model, the malpractice plaintiff 
must prove that it would have received a more favorable judgment in the 
underlying case (litigation) but for the malpractice of the attorney.17
However, this model is only a species of the general class of injuries that 
may be suffered by clients due to the malpractice of their attorneys.18   
When the malpractice plaintiff has suffered injury in other than the 
form of the loss of a favorable judgment as a consequence of the 
malpractice of its attorney, this type of case-within-a-case will be termed 
herein as the “non-judgment” model.19  The plaintiff, of course, bears 
 11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. b 
(2000). 
 12. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention 
was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on 
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United 
States[.]”).  See, e.g., Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump, 504 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) discussed infra text accompanying notes 82-129, where the allegation of malpractice was that 
plaintiff’s patent attorneys had failed to raise the defense of a statutory bar with respect to the patent 
asserted against plaintiff.   
 13. See, e.g., LaBelle v. McGonagle, No. 07-12097-GAO, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63117, at 
*6 (D. Mass. Aug. 15, 2008). 
 14. Id.
 15. See ASTech, LLC v. Husick, 676 F. Supp. 2d 389, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2009).  
 16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. b. 
 17. Id.
 18. See id.
 19.  As expressed in the Restatement (Third) of the Law: The Law Governing Lawyers: 
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the burden of proving it suffered actual damages of a nature other than 
the loss of a favorable judgment in the underlying case.20  To further 
illustrate these models, a more comprehensive definition of the “case-
within-” (i.e., the underlying case) may be helpful. 
Indeed, “case” has a broader connotation than litigation/trial/suit.  
The venerable Black’s Law Dictionary gives the following definition:  
“case . . . [a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit, or controversy at 
law or in equity.”21  Thus, according to this definition, it would be 
appropriate to consider a “controversy” as being included within the 
“case-within-” (the underlying case) as well as “proceeding, action, suit” 
to which “trial” could be added.   
Courts, particularly those who are following the judgment model, 
often refer to “case-within-a-case” as a doctrine,22 rule,23 requirement,24
  A plaintiff may show that the defendant’s negligence or fiduciary breach caused 
injury other than the loss of a judgment.  For example, a plaintiff may contend that, in a 
previous action, the plaintiff would have obtained a settlement but for the malpractice of 
the lawyer who then represented the plaintiff.  A plaintiff might contend that the 
defendant in the previous action made a settlement offer, that the plaintiff’s then lawyer 
negligently failed to inform plaintiff of the offer (see § 20(3)), and that, if informed, 
plaintiff would have accepted the offer.  If the plaintiff can prove this, the plaintiff can 
recover the difference between what the claimant would have received under the 
settlement offer and the amount, if any, the claimant in fact received through later 
settlement or judgment.  Similarly, in appropriate circumstances, a plaintiff who can 
establish that the negligence or fiduciary breach of the plaintiff’s former lawyer deprived 
the plaintiff of a substantial chance of prevailing and that, due to that misconduct, the 
results of a previous trial cannot be reconstructed, may recover for the loss of that chance 
in jurisdictions recognizing such a theory of recovery in professional-malpractice cases 
generally. 
  The plaintiff in a previous civil action may recover without proving the results of a 
trial if the party claims damages other than loss of a judgment.  For example, a lawyer 
who negligently discloses a client’s trade secret during litigation might be liable for harm 
to the client’s business caused by the disclosure. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. b. 
 20. See ASTech, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 402. 
 21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 243 (9th ed. 2009).  The use of this source seems particularly 
apropos in view of the Federal Circuit’s reliance on it in Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A. for the 
definition of a “claim” in a malpractice complaint.  596 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 22. See, e.g., Davis, 596 F.3d at 1360-61 (citing Envtl. Network Corp. v. Goodman Weiss 
Miller, LLP, 893 N.E.2d 173, 175 (Ohio 2008) and Vahila v. Hall, 674 N.E.2d 1164, 1168-69 (Ohio 
1997)); see also Dan Nelson Constr., Inc. v. Nodland & Dickson, 608 N.W.2d 267, 271 (N.D. 
2000).    
23. See, e.g., Bauer v. Dyer, 782 So. 2d 1133, 1140 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Young v. Gum, 649 
S.E.2d 469, 473 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
 24. See, e.g., Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump, 504 F.3d 1262, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 
2007); Adamasu v. Gifford, No. 273895, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1034, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 
15, 2008). 
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or element,25 thus giving the impression that it is mandatory that the 
malpractice plaintiff prove that it would have prevailed to judgment in 
the underlying case to recover in the malpractice case.  Recognizing that 
“case” has a broader meaning than “litigation” to include 
“controversies” may help to avoid this significant limitation to the scope 
of legal malpractice cases (controversies).  Other courts have preferred 
to categorize “case-within-a-case” as a methodology26 or analysis27
rather than as a doctrine/rule/requirement/element.  There seems to be 
considerable merit in this usage because the “case-within-a-case” 
methodology is being used whether the malpractice plaintiff is alleging 
damages for the failure to obtain a favorable judgment in the underlying 
litigation (judgment model) or actual damages suffered as a result of 
malpractice in representation in the underlying controversy (non-
judgment model).28
In both the judgment and non-judgment models, in the context of a 
malpractice case based on negligence, the duty and breach elements 
(constituting negligence) are the same for both the malpractice case and 
the underlying case (controversy), where malpractice is alleged to have 
occurred.29  However, in the “judgment” model, the causation and 
damage elements are conflated, with the only damage recoverable by the 
plaintiff being the hypothetical loss of a favorable judgment had the trial 
been held in the underlying case.30  Accordingly, the only “cognizable” 
damage in the “judgment” model is the loss of a favorable judgment in 
the hypothetical underlying case-within-a-case.31  There is, of course, no 
causal relationship between the negligent conduct of the defendant 
attorney and any damage suffered by the malpractice plaintiff, if damage 
 25. See, e.g., Spaise v. Dodd, No. A03-1430, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 607, at *22 (Minn. Ct. 
App. June 1, 2004) (requiring appellant to prove that he would have been successful in the 
underlying action as an element of his claim in order to recover in his malpractice suit); Fiedler v. 
Adams, 466 N.W.2d 39, 42 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).  Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1269, uses case-
within-a-case “context” (quoted infra text at note 478).  
 26. See, e.g., Cecala v. Newman, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1140 (D. Ariz. 2007); ASTech, LLC 
v. Husick, 676 F. Supp. 2d 389, 400-01 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Herrington v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 658, 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 27. See, e.g., Stockbridge v. Chedraue, No. 206942, 1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 417, at *3 (Feb. 
26, 1999); Apollo Enters., Inc. v. ScripNet, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 848, 870 (Tex. App. 2009) (citing Tex. 
Logos, L.P. v. Brinkmeyer, 254 S.W.3d 644, 654 (Tex. App. 2008)).    
 28. See ASTech, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 401-02 (discussing application of the case-within-a-case 
methodology in both those situations in which the underlying claim involved litigation and those in 
which it did not).   
 29. See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 36:1. 
 30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. b 
(2000). 
 31. Id.
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is limited to the loss of a favorable judgment in the underlying case and 
the plaintiff cannot establish that specific form of damage. 
In the “non-judgment” model, the duty-breach-causation elements 
are the same as in the “judgment” model;32 however, the damage 
element is determined by the nature of the damage the malpractice 
plaintiff pleads it has actually suffered, and such damage is not limited 
to prevailing in any hypothetical underlying case that would have 
resulted in a favorable judgment.33  In other words, the malpractice 
plaintiff in the “non-judgment” model is not required to prove it would 
have obtained a judgment in the underlying case, but only that it suffered 
actual damages causally related to defendant attorney’s negligence in the 
underlying transaction.34  These damages may be based on a variety of 
theories.35
In using the “case-within-a-case” methodology, it is important to 
recognize that the underlying case that precipitated the malpractice claim 
is not limited to litigation that would have resulted in a favorable 
judgment for the malpractice plaintiff, but also includes any controversy 
where, due to the malpractice of the attorney, plaintiff has suffered 
damages.36  The judgment and non-judgment models provide an 
explanatory framework.  The elements of a legal malpractice case 
remain the same in both models, with the understanding that the damage 
element may be satisfied by the loss of a favorable judgment or other 
actual damages in the underlying case (controversy).37
A. Jurisdiction—Federal or State 
Malpractice cases brought against patent attorneys have a further 
complication.  Malpractice cases traditionally fall within the jurisdiction 
 32. See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 36:1. 
 33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. b. 
 34. Id.
 35. See 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 3, Part IV (damages); see also John C.P. Goldberg, 
What Clients Are Owed:  Cautionary Observations on Lawyers and Loss of Chance, 52 EMORY L.J. 
1201, 1212-13 (2003) (advocating against the application of the loss-of-chance doctrine in legal 
malpractice cases); Kessler, supra note 3, at 516-17 (advocating for the application of the loss-of-
chance doctrine in legal malpractice cases and arguing that calculating the lost settlement value of a 
case is the best method by which to calculate loss of chance); Polly A. Lord, Loss of Chance in 
Legal Malpractice, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1479 (1986) (discussing the loss-of-chance doctrine and 
advocating for application of the doctrine in certain legal malpractice cases); Id. at 1491-94. 
(advocating for the application of the loss-of- chance doctrine in legal malpractice actions that meet 
certain criteria).  
 36. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35. 
 37. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35.
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of state courts as state common law causes of action.38  Cases “arising 
under” the federal patent statute are within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the federal courts.39  The issue then becomes whether malpractice cases 
against patent attorneys should fall within the jurisdiction of state courts, 
which would then be required to resolve questions of patent law, or 
whether such cases should fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
federal courts, which would then be required to resolve state questions of 
malpractice law.    
For better or worse, depending on one’s point of view, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has, at least so far, broadly assumed 
federal subject matter jurisdiction in malpractice cases involving patent 
attorneys based upon its definition of what constitutes a “substantial 
question of federal patent law.”40  The result, essentially, is that federal 
courts will decide state malpractice issues rather than state courts 
deciding federal patent law issues, although at least two judges on the 
Federal Circuit would limit the scope of the court’s jurisdiction but for 
stare decisis, and there are pockets of resistance in both state and federal 
courts to this perceived usurpation of historic state jurisdiction over legal 
malpractice claims.41
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by the 
Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982.42  The Federal Circuit was 
granted exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) over “an 
appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States . . . in 
any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has 
 38. See Minton v. Gunn (Minton I), 301 S.W.3d 702, 709 (Tex. App. 2009), overruled on 
other grounds by Minton v. Gunn (Minton II), 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2010). 
 39.  28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).  See infra text accompanying note 44 (quoting statute).      
 40. On the federal subject matter jurisdictional issue, see generally 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra 
note 3, § 35:4; DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §21.02 [1] & Supp (2011 ed.); see also
Robert A. Mathews, Annotated Patent Digest § 36:19 (database updated Sept. 2011) (digesting 
jurisdictional cases involving patent attorney malpractice); Michael Ena, Comment, Jurisdictional 
Issues in the Adjudication of Patent Law Malpractice Cases in Light of Recent Federal Circuit 
Decisions, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 219 (2008) (discussing Air 
Measurement/Immunocept and their implications for patent law practitioners); Christopher G. 
Wilson, Note, Embedded Federal Questions, Exclusive Jurisdiction, and Patent-Based Malpractice 
Claims, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1237 (2009) (supporting state jurisdiction).  
 41. See Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 2011-1012, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127 
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2011) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 267-96); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 402-17, 424-53 (discussing cases challenging the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit).  As stated in Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C., 666 F. Supp. 2d 749, 752 
(E.D. Mich. 2009), vacated, 631 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011), “[T]he Federal Circuit appears to 
impose . . . an all-embracing test, effectively aggregating ever greater swaths of state-law claims 
into its jurisdictional sweep.”
 42. Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. 
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asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress 
relating to patents . . . .”43  Under § 1338(a), federal district courts are 
granted “original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any act of 
Congress relating to patents. . . .”44  Prior to this grant of exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit, appeals from patent 
decisions of district courts were to the regional court of appeals.45
Among the reasons given for the creation of the Federal Circuit were to 
have patent cases decided by the expertise of a specialized court and to 
provide greater consistency in decisions relating to patents.46  With this 
creation of exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit, 
questions had to arise of the interfaces of that jurisdiction with the 
regional federal circuit courts of appeal and with state courts. 
This article will first provide a brief history of the jurisdictional 
controversy between federal courts and between federal courts and state 
courts.  Then, the question will be examined of how the subject matter 
jurisdictional question has been resolved with respect to patent attorney 
malpractice cases to the extent it has been to date in the federal and state 
courts.  The manner in which the case-within-a-case doctrine or 
methodology has been used in deciding the jurisdictional question will 
also be investigated.  In addition, the relevance of the use of the 
judgment or non-judgment model to determine patent attorney 
malpractice will be explored.  Consideration will also be given to those 
decisions that have opposed a broad imposition of federal jurisdiction 
over malpractice cases involving patent attorneys.  In conclusion, some 
general observations will be offered concerning the jurisdictional and 
substantive issues raised in patent attorney malpractice cases.  A detailed 
discussion of all jurisdictional issues arising in patent attorney 
malpractice cases, however, will not be undertaken here as the focus of 
this article is the case-within-a-case methodology in the resolution of the 
 43. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1295(a)(1) (Lexis 2011). 
 44. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006). 
 45. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1989) (discussing the divergence among the regional circuits in patent 
cases as a region for the creation of the Federal Circuit). 
 46. For the historical background of the creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 1982-1990 (Marion T. Bennett ed., 1991); 
Federal Circuit 25th Anniversary Edition, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 123 (2007); Richard H. Seamon, The 
Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543 (2003); 
Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts:  The Legislative Response, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1003 (1991). 
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basic question of whether there is federal or state jurisdiction over the 
case.47   
B. Brief History of Jurisdictional Issues 
1. United States Supreme Court and “Arising Under” Jurisdiction 
In 1988, the Supreme Court, in Christianson v. Colt Industries 
Operating Corp. (Christianson IV),48 interpreted § 1338(a) in order to 
resolve a jurisdictional controversy between the Federal Circuit and the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and hence to avoid, as Justice 
Brennan referred to it, “a perpetual game of jurisdictional ping pong.”49
Both courts denied having jurisdiction.50  Christianson was a former 
employee of Colt who began to sell M-16 rifle parts in competition with 
Colt.51  Colt brought suit in a federal district court against Christianson 
and others for patent infringement, and breach of proprietary information 
and non-disclosure agreements.52  After Colt voluntarily dismissed its 
claims against Christianson, he brought antitrust actions under the 
Clayton and Sherman Acts against Colt, and also included allegations 
that the Colt patents were invalid for failing to satisfy the enabling and 
best-made requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 of the Patent Act.53  In the 
district court, Christianson prevailed on antitrust counts against Colt and 
also had nine of Colt’s patents declared invalid.54
Colt appealed to the Federal Circuit; however, the Federal Circuit 
declined jurisdiction and referred the case to the Seventh Circuit.55  The 
Seventh Circuit, sua sponte, raised the jurisdictional issue and 
determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction; rather, the 
Federal Circuit did.56  The Federal Circuit then “in the interest of 
justice” proceeded to take the appeal and reversed the district court.57
 47. See infra text accompanying notes 477-82 (identifying a number of these jurisdiction 
issues). 
 48. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. (Christianson IV), 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
 49. Id. at 818-19. 
 50. Id. at 803. 
 51. Id. at 804. 
 52. Id.
 53. Id. at 805. 
 54. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. (Christianson I), 613 F. Supp. 330, 331-32 
(C.D. Ill. 1985). 
 55. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. (Christianson II), 798 F.2d 1051, 1055 (7th 
Cir. 1986).    
 56. Id.
 57. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. (Christianson III), 822 F.2d 1544, 1560 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987), vacated by 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and resolved the controversy 
by applying prior “arising under” holdings.58  The Court concluded: 
Linguistic consistency, to which we have historically adhered, 
demands that § 1338(a) jurisdiction likewise extend only to those cases 
in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent 
law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief 
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal 
patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-
pleaded claims.59
The Court concluded that neither the antitrust claims nor the state claim 
arose under patent law, so the jurisdictional issue here depended upon 
“whether patent law ‘is a necessary element of one of the well pleaded 
[antitrust] claims.’”60  As the antitrust claims could be resolved without 
reference to patent law, the Court held that the Federal Circuit did not 
have “arising under” jurisdiction.61
Thus, there are two prongs to the appellate jurisdiction of Federal 
Circuit:  (1) “primary” jurisdiction where “federal patent statute creates 
the cause of action”62 (e.g. patent infringement), and (2) “substantial 
question” jurisdiction where “plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily 
depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in 
that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded 
claims.”63
With respect to the interface between state jurisdiction and federal 
jurisdiction, in 1986, the Supreme Court had held in Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson64 that “a complaint alleging a 
violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action, 
when Congress has determined that there should be no private, federal 
cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim ‘arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,’” that would grant 
federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.65
 58. Christianson IV, 486 U.S. 800, 807 (1988). 
 59. Id. at 808-09 (emphasis added). 
 60. Id.
 61. Id. at 812-13.  The Court also concluded that in the “interests of justice” trying to resolve 
a “ping pong” situation did not authorize a court to decide a case in the absence of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 818. 
 62. Id. at 808-09.  
 63. Id.
 64. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).   
65. Id. at 817 (citation omitted). 
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In Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & 
Manufacturing,66 decided in 2005, the Court resolved a conflict within 
the circuits as to whether Merrell Dow required a federal cause of action 
“arising under” the statute in question as a condition for exercising 
federal jurisdiction.67  The Court held that it did not when the question 
involved the interpretation of an Internal Revenue Code provision 
relating to the notice requirement for quieting title.68  The Court stated 
that Merrell Dow was not to the contrary;69 however, it did provide the 
following qualification: 
Because arising-under jurisdiction to hear a state-law claim always 
raises the possibility of upsetting the state-federal line drawn (or at 
least assumed) by Congress, the presence of a disputed federal issue 
and the ostensible importance of a federal forum are never necessarily 
dispositive; there must always be an assessment of any disruptive 
portent in exercising federal jurisdiction. . . . 
  These considerations have kept us from stating a “single, precise, 
all-embracing” test for jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in 
state-law claims between nondiverse parties. . . . Instead, the question 
is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, 
actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain 
without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal 
and state judicial responsibilities.70
As will be seen by the following decisions of the Federal Circuit 
defining its subject matter jurisdiction under § 1338(a) in patent attorney 
malpractice cases, it has laid primary emphasis on Christianson VI,
liberally interpreting what constitutes a “substantial question of federal 
patent law” within the context of the “case-within-a-case.”71
 66. Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005), reh’g 
denied, 545 U.S. 1158 (2005). 
 67. Id. at 311-12. 
 68. Id. at 319-20. 
 69. Id. at 316. 
 70. Id. at 314. 
 71. However, more recently in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite (Lab. 
Corp. IV), 599 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the Federal Circuit appeared to be giving more deference 
to Grable. See infra text accompanying note 221 (discussing this case).  Moreover, in the most 
recent case relating to jurisdiction in a patent malpractice case, Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, 
LLP, 2011-2012, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *13, *15-17 (Fed Cir. Nov. 18, 2011), two 
judges would revisit the scope of federal jurisdiction.  See infra text accompanying notes 267-96 
(discussing this case). 
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2. Federal Circuit Jurisdiction and Case-Within-a-Case 
In a series of cases prior to any case dealing with patent attorney 
malpractice, the Federal Circuit held that it had jurisdiction based on a 
substantial question of patent law arising in a number of contexts.72  In 
Additive Controls & Measurement Systems, Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc.,73
decided in 1993, the court held that there was federal jurisdiction over a 
state business disparagement claim that required proof of non-
infringement of a patent to resolve the case.74  Similarly, in Hunter 
Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc.,75 decided in 1998, the court 
found federal jurisdiction over a state law claim of injurious falsehood 
that required proof of the invalidity of a patent.76  In 2000, the court in 
U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray,77 held that there was § 1338 jurisdiction over a 
breach of contract claim that required proof of patent infringement.78  In 
2002, the court held in University of West Virginia v. VanVoorhies79 that 
there was § 1338 jurisdiction over the issue of whether there was a 
breach of duty to assign a patent required determination if the disputed 
patent application was a continuation-in-part application.80
It was not, however, until 2007 that the Federal Circuit had an 
opportunity to address the issue of whether it had subject matter over a 
state malpractice case involving patent attorneys in two cases, decided 
on the same day by the same panel.81  In Air Measurement 
Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump (Air Measurement),82 plaintiff (AMT) 
filed a malpractice claim against its former patent firms  (defendants) in 
a Texas state court alleging that, due to the defendants’ negligence, 
plaintiff was “forced . . . to settle the prior litigation far below the fair 
 72. Additive Controls & Measurements Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 478-79 
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 
U.S. Valves, Inc., v. Dray, Sr., 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Univ. of W. Va., Bd. of Trs. 
v. Vanvoorhies, 278 F.3d 1288, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
 73. Additive Controls, 986 F.2d 476. 
 74. Id. at 478. 
 75. Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d 1318, overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. 
Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Traffix Devices v. 
Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 76. Id. at 1329.  
 77. U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d 1368. 
 78. Id. at 1372.  Accord Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(finding § 1338 jurisdiction and transferring case to Federal Circuit court where proof of breach of 
contract claim requires proof of infringement).  See discussion of Fifth Circuit cases, infra text 
accompanying notes 324-40. 
 79. Univ. of W. Va., Bd. of Trs. v. Vanvoorhies, 278 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 80. Id. at 1295. 
 81. See Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump, 504 F.3d 1262, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2007).   
 82. Id.
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market value of the patents because the prior litigation defendants were, 
inter alia, able to raise as defenses invalidity (e.g., an on sale bar) and 
unenforceability (due to inequitable conduct) that would not have 
existed without attorney error.”83  Indeed, six infringement cases were 
settled by AMT “for a total of approximately $10 million without a 
judicial determination of infringement, invalidity, or unenforceability of 
AMT’s patents.”84  The defendants then removed the case to the Federal 
District Court for the Western District of Texas.85  Plaintiff then moved 
to have the case remanded to state court, which was denied.86
The parties then changed their jurisdictional positions, with 
defendants now moving to have the case remanded to state court, which 
was opposed by plaintiff AMT.87  The district court again refused to 
remand the case.88  Defendants appealed the jurisdictional issue to the 
Federal Circuit, which accepted it as presenting an issue of “first 
impression.”89  To resolve the question, the Federal Circuit (opinion by 
Chief Judge Michel, joined by Judges Lourie and Rader) applied the 
“second prong” of Christianson test to determine “whether patent law is 
a necessary element of [plaintiff’s] malpractice claim.”90  The court 
recited the elements of a malpractice case in Texas91 and concluded that 
the case-within-a-case “requirement” applied: 
Because AMT’s malpractice claim stems in part from unsuccessful 
prior litigation, AMT must establish that they would have prevailed in 
the prior litigation but for Akin Gump’s negligence that compromised 
the litigation.  This is called the “case-within-a-case” requirement of 
the proximate cause element of malpractice.92
As authority for the proposition that the “case-within-a-case 
requirement” is a component of the “proximate cause” element of a 
malpractice action, the court cites and quotes from a Texas appellate 
court case:  “Because the plaintiff must establish that the underlying suit 
would have been won ‘but for’ the attorney’s breach of duty, this ‘suit 
within a suit’ requirement is necessarily a component of the plaintiff’s 
 83. Id. at 1266 (citations omitted). 
 84. Id.
 85. Id.
 86. Id.
 87. Id. at 1267. 
 88. Id.
 89. Id.
 90. Id. at 1268. 
 91. Id. at 1268-69 (citing Ballesteros v. Jones, 985 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Tex. App. 1998))
(emphasis added).   
 92. Id. (emphasis added). 
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burden on cause in fact.” 93  This reliance is not further explained, but 
the court goes on to conclude: 
Because proof of patent infringement is necessary to show AMT 
would have prevailed in the prior litigation, patent infringement is a 
“necessary element” of AMT’s malpractice claim and therefore 
apparently presents a substantial question of patent law conferring § 
1338 jurisdiction.94
While “proof of patent infringement is necessary to show AMT would 
have prevailed in the prior litigation,” it does not follow that “patent 
infringement is a ‘necessary element’ of AMT’s malpractice claim . . . 
.”95  The damages being claimed by AMT in the malpractice claim are 
not infringement damages, but rather “impaired settlement value” as a 
consequence of defendants’ alleged malpractice.96  Thus, the Federal 
Circuit seems to adopt, without elaboration, the “judgment” model of the 
case-within-a-case methodology, leading to the same requirements for a 
finding of federal jurisdiction as for malpractice action where the 
plaintiff must prove that it would have obtained a judgment in the 
underlying case.97  This result will be further explored below.98
To buttress its jurisdictional finding the Federal Circuit reasoned:  
Indeed, we would consider it illogical for the Western District of Texas 
to have jurisdiction under § 1338 to hear the underlying infringement 
suit and for us then to determine that the same court does not have 
jurisdiction under § 1338 to hear the same substantial patent question 
in the “case-within-a-case” context of a state malpractice claim.99
Thus, the logical conclusion would seem to be that, if the underlying 
case (infringement) would invoke the “first prong” of the “arising under” 
jurisdiction interpretation of § 1338(a) in Christianson VI, then the 
“second prong” would also be satisfied.  It seems clear that if plaintiff 
must prove patent infringement, there is a “significant question of patent 
law,” but the fact that a district court has jurisdiction over a patent 
infringement case does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a 
finding of patent infringement is the only means by which the patent 
 93. Id. at 1269 (citing Ballesteros, 985 S.W.2d at 489) (emphasis added). 
 94. Id. (citing Christianson IV, 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988)) (emphasis added). 
 95. Id. (emphasis added). 
 96. See id. at 1270-71. 
 97. See id.
 98. See infra text accompanying notes 119-29. 
 99. Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump, 504 F.3d 1262, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(emphasis added).  
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owner might have suffered damages as a consequence of patent attorney 
negligence.100
As the court considered proof of infringement as critical to the 
jurisdiction issue, it also noted that, in addition to proving patent 
infringement within the “‘case-within-a-case’ context,” the plaintiff 
would have to show that it would have prevailed against the defenses 
that the prior litigants raised.101  These defenses included allegations of a 
statutory bar and inequitable conduct.102  The court did not consider 
these as “jurisdiction-defeating defenses contemplated by Christianson, . 
. . for they are part of the malpractice causation element rather than the 
defenses raised by [defendants] in the current litigation.”103  However, in 
the context of whether these defenses had to be valid or merely 
available, the court states rather cryptically:  “To the extent that AMT 
has to prove or overcome invalidity, invalidity may be a substantial 
question of patent law.”104  The court then states the ultimate importance 
of proving infringement for jurisdictional purposes:  “Regardless of the 
defenses AMT would have to address, if any, AMT would certainly have 
to prove patent infringement; that alone confers § 1338 jurisdiction.”105
The court does not address the question of whether the defenses 
themselves would raise a substantial question of patent law justifying the 
grant of federal jurisdiction.106  Certainly, the potential invalidity of a 
patent because of a statutory bar or its unenforceability because of 
inequitable conduct is as critical to the patent owner as is proving 
infringement.107  Indeed, the issue of infringement, of course, depends 
on the validity and enforceability of the patents being asserted.108
 100. See Christianson IV, 486 U.S. 800, 811-12 (1988). 
 101. Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1270. 
 102. Id. at 1266. 
 103. Id. at 1270. 
 104. Id. (emphasis added). 
 105. Id.
 106. Id.
 107. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006): 
The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement of a 
patent and shall be pleaded: 
(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforceability, 
(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part II of this 
title as a condition for patentability, 
(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with any 
requirement of sections 112 or 251 of this title, 
(4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this title.   
 108. Id.
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The Federal Circuit finally addressed the damage issue, but still 
within the context of patent infringement.109  In an attempt to avoid 
federal jurisdiction, defendants contended that the “impaired settlement 
value theory . . . is a novel theory of malpractice that does not require the 
resolution of a substantial question of patent law.”110  The court 
dismisses this argument, viewing “the impaired settlement value theory 
as a theory of damages not a theory of liability for malpractice.”111  It 
defined “the impaired settlement value theory as calculat[ing] the 
difference between the actual settlement amount and the predicted 
settlement amount absent [of] malpractice.”112  But then the court goes 
on without further elaboration:  “In addition to computation of damages, 
AMT must still prove it would have been successful in the underlying 
litigation but for the alleged errors, which will require proof of patent 
infringement.”113  This conclusion begs the question:  Why in addition 
to the computation of damages (presumably according to the loss of 
settlement value theory) must plaintiff prove infringement?  It would 
appear that the purpose of a settlement is to avoid the expense and 
uncertainty of the outcome of an infringement trial.114  The settlement 
presumably would have occurred prior to any judgment of infringement 
being reached.115  Indeed, in this case, the six infringement cases were 
settled for about $10 million without any determination of infringement 
or entering of a judgment to that effect.116  What plaintiff is claiming is 
that, because of the negligent handling of the litigation, it was unable to 
settle the infringement case at a higher value than it would otherwise 
have had defendants not been negligent.117  This determination is 
 109. Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1271. 
 110. Id. at 1270. 
 111. Id. at 1271. 
 112. Id.  The court presumably accepts this theory of damages based on Texas state law.  
However, Professor Dobbs observes: 
[T]he fact that every case has a settlement value, even if it is very small, does not mean 
that the plaintiff-client whose case would have been lost even by the best lawyering 
should recover a settlement value from her malpracticing lawyer.  It is convenient to 
treat these examples in the discussion of remedies, but they suggest that the case with a 
case puzzle probably has not been finally solved.  
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 486 (2000).  
 113. Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1271. 
 114. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical 
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 312 
(2006) (finding that “most patent cases settle fairly quickly . . . thereby reducing the actual cost of 
patent litigation considerably.”). 
 115. Id.
 116. Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1266. 
 117. Id.
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independent of any finding of infringement.  The value of the settlement 
would, seemingly, depend on the strength of the patent, which, 
according to plaintiff, was undermined by defendants’ negligence.118  If 
plaintiff must prove that the patent was infringed, this eliminates loss of 
settlement value as a theory of damages. 
The confusion is confirmed by the following sentence of the court:  
“Thus, the impaired settlement value theory does not obviate the ‘case-
within-a-case’ element of AMT’s claim.”119  Indeed, the case-within-a-
case methodology is essential to plaintiff’s malpractice claim, because, if 
plaintiff can prove impairment of the settlement value that would not 
have occurred but for the negligence of defendants, plaintiff would have 
satisfied the elements of its malpractice case—presuming that the non-
judgment model is recognized.120  Plaintiff may be able to prove that 
there was a loss of settlement value even if the patents would 
hypothetically have been found not to be infringed.  It would seem, if 
patents involved in litigation have a settlement value prior to a judgment 
being entered by a court for infringement, that settlement value may be 
adversely affected by negligent conduct on the part of plaintiff’s 
attorneys in the infringement litigation.  It does not seem justified to 
presume that a patent has a settlement value only if it would have been 
infringed. 
The final argument raised by defendants in Air Measurement
against the grant of federal jurisdiction was that “Grable adds a new 
dimension to the Christianson test based on the congressionally-
 118. Id. at 1271; On settling patent infringement cases, see Kesan & Ball, supra note 114, at 
243 (footnotes omitted): 
There is general agreement that the costs associated with pursuing a patent lawsuit are 
high.  Previous authors have cited legal costs of patent litigation running from $500,000 
to $3 million per suit or $500,000 per claim at issue per side.  These costs create 
incentives for the parties to settle their dispute rather than seek a final judgment on the 
merits.  Throughout the case, the parties will be receiving additional information about 
the strength of their positions through the results of discovery, the court’s construction of 
the patent claims at issue, rulings on motions for summary judgment, rulings on 
preliminary injunctions, and the like.  Economic theory suggests that when it becomes 
obvious that a patent is very likely to be invalidated, it is in the best interests of the 
patent holder to offer a cheap license to keep the patent rights intact, and it is in the best 
interests of the defendant to accept such an offer rather than incur further significant 
legal costs.  Specifically, it is in the interest of the alleged infringer to accept a license if 
its cost would be less than the cost of continued litigation.  Only patent disputes where it 
is difficult to predict who will win are likely to proceed further to a final determination 
on the merits.  
 119.  Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1271 (emphasis added). 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20 and 26-34.  
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approved balance between federal and state jurisdiction.”121  The 
Federal Circuit rejects this argument, asserting that there is a strong 
federal interest in adjudicating patent infringement issues in federal 
courts as patents are issued by a federal agency and also that litigants 
benefit from the expertise of federal judges in “construction and 
infringement matters.”122
It is not apparent from the reasoning in Air Measurement whether 
the Federal Circuit is adopting a judgment model of the case-within-a-
case methodology.  The problem faced by plaintiff—now having 
prevailed on the federal jurisdiction issue—is whether, in order to 
recover any damages, it must prove infringement of its patents and 
prevail over the defenses of invalidity as being statutorily barred and 
unenforceability for inequitable conduct.123
If the court is adopting the judgment model, it would result in the 
introduction of a case-within-a-case methodology in the underlying case 
(the case-within-) to establish jurisdiction (duty-breach-causation-
damages (infringement)).124  The same case-within-a-case methodology 
would then be applied to the underlying case to resolve the malpractice 
(duty-breach-causation–damages (infringement or “impaired settlement 
value”?)).125  Hence, the result is the application of the case-within-a-
case-within-a-case “approach.”126  The consequences of this approach 
would seem to result in “the tail wagging the dog,” with the resolution of 
the jurisdiction issue seemingly determining the scope of the malpractice 
case.  For jurisdiction, the malpractice plaintiff must prove infringement 
and must also prove infringement for malpractice damages to be 
awarded, even though the claimed damage is diminished settlement 
value, not infringement damages.127  The court conflates the 
jurisdictional issue (“substantial question of patent law”) with the 
malpractice case,128 while federal “arising under” jurisdiction need only 
be established by a substantial question of patent law being raised, 
presumably with respect to any element (duty, breach, causation, 
damage) of the malpractice case.129   
 121. Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1271. 
 122. Id. at 1272. 
 123. See id. at 1270-71. 
 124. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35. 
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35. 
 126. The word “approach” is used here for want of a better term. 
 127. Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1271.   
 128. Id.
 129. See infra text accompanying notes 251-55. 
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The companion case to Air Measurement, Immunocept, LLC v. 
Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP (Immunocept II),130 originated as a 
malpractice case filed in the same district court in Texas, with plaintiff 
alleging that the defendant firm had negligently limited the scope of a 
claim in the patent prosecuted by the firm by using the “closed” 
transition phrase “consisting of” rather than an “open” transition such as 
“comprising.”131  As a consequence, a potential licensee under the patent 
terminated negotiations.132  The district court held, inter alia, that the 
malpractice claim was barred by the Texas statute of limitations, and 
plaintiff appealed.133  The Federal Circuit (before the same panel as in 
Air Measurement) raised the subject matter jurisdiction issue sua sponte,
and both sides briefed this issue, agreeing that there was federal 
jurisdiction over the case.134  The Federal Circuit also agreed, affirming 
the finding of § 1338 jurisdiction.135
In finding jurisdiction, the court reasoned that, because plaintiff’s 
malpractice case was based on the allegation of a claim drafting error, it 
could not “prevail without addressing claim scope.”136  The court then 
easily found jurisdiction:  “Because patent claim scope defines the scope 
of patent protection, . . . we surely consider claim scope to be a 
substantial question of patent law.”137
Thus, determining it had jurisdiction, the court proceeded to affirm 
the district court’s holding that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the Texas 
statute of limitations.138  Texas follows a discovery rule in legal 
 130. Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP (Immunocept II), 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007), reh’g denied, 2006-1432, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26823 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2007). 
 131. Id. at 1283.  See DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8:06[b][1][ii][A]-[C] (2011) 
(discussing “open” and “closed” transitional terms.  In particular, see id. note 47 (citation omitted):  
Quoting treatise, “Some information pertaining to patent claim drafting is in order.  
There are three parts to a claim: the preamble, the transition and the body.  The transition 
is the part with which we currently are concerned.”; Three categories or transition:  
“Generally, there are three categories of transitions. . . . An open-ended transition is 
recognized by use of the term ‘comprising’ or the phrase ‘which comprises.’. . . A 
closed-ended transition employs either the phrase ‘consisting of’ or the phrase ‘which 
consists of.’ . . . Finally, the intermediate transition, sometimes referred to as nearly 
closed-ended, is identified by either the phrase ‘consisting essentially of’ or ‘which 
consists essentially of.’ . . . The intermediate transition excludes ‘additional, unspecified 
components that would affect the basic and novel characteristics of the product defined 
in the balance of the claim.’” 
 132. Immunocept II, 504 F.3d at 1283.  
 133. Id. at 1284. 
 134. Id.
 135. Id. at 1286. 
 136. Id. at 1285. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1288. 
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malpractice cases.139  The court quotes from a decision of the Texas 
Supreme Court indicating that, under the discovery rule, the statute of 
limitations begins to run when a “client discovers or should have 
discovered through the exercise of a reasonable care and diligence facts 
establishing the elements of a cause of action.”140  In this case, after the 
patent issued including the alleged claim drafting error, plaintiff retained 
an attorney from another patent law firm to obtain additional patent 
protection in the same technical area.141  Within the scope of his 
assignment and prior to the critical date for triggering the statute of 
limitations, plaintiff’s attorney reviewed the patent in question, including 
the file history, prior art, and claim scope.142  On the basis of this 
finding, the court concluded that the reviewing attorney knew or should 
have known of the drafting error prior to the critical time and imputed 
this knowledge to plaintiff as of that date; hence plaintiff’s claim was 
barred.143   
It is interesting to note that there is no mention of case-within-a-
case, and only the following reference to patent infringement:  “As a 
determination of patent infringement serves as the basis of § 1338 
jurisdiction over related state law claims, so does a determination of 
claim scope.  After all, claim scope determination is the first step of a 
patent infringement analysis.”144  There is, however, no indication that 
the court would require the plaintiff in Immunocept II to prove patent 
infringement by a prospective licensee or otherwise.145  Because the 
court decides the case on the statute of limitation issue, it does not reach 
the damage issue.146  The damages alleged by the plaintiff as reported in 
the district court opinion are:  “lost profits, lost royalties, loss of time 
and money expended, and other remedial costs.”147  The plaintiff clearly 
is not claiming that its damages are based on its failure to prove 
infringement because of the error in claiming.148  The plaintiff lost an 
opportunity to license the patent because of the claiming error149 (not 
 139. See id. at 1286. 
 140. Id. (citing Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Tex. 2001)). 
 141. Id. at 1283. 
 142. Id. at 1286. 
 143. Id. at 1287-88. 
 144. Id. at 1285 (citation omitted). 
 145. See id. at 1284-85. 
 146. Id. at 1289. 
 147. Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP (Immunocept I), No. A-05-CA-334-SS, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96912, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2006).  
 148. Id.
 149. Immunocept II, 504 F.3d at 1286. 
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unlike AMT’s loss of opportunity to settle the underlying case at a 
higher level).150  The prospective licensee presumably desired broader 
patent protection to exploit the invention.151  The causation element of 
the case-within-a-case would appear to be:  But for the negligence in 
drafting the claims, the plaintiff would have licensed the patent and 
would have profited from this whether or not anyone infringed the 
broadened patent.  Hence, the case-within-a-case methodology would be 
satisfied by loss of revenue from the failure to license, rather than by any 
hypothetical infringement by the potential licensee, with the proviso that 
the broader claim was found to be otherwise patentable.152   
While not explicit, it would appear that the court in Immunocept II
is recognizing the “non-judgment” model by basing jurisdiction on the 
free-standing issue of claim-scope independent of any requirement that 
plaintiff prove infringement of claims of a non-negligently drafted 
scope.153  There is no indication that the plaintiff would have to prove a 
judgment against anyone for infringement or otherwise, but plaintiff 
would only have to prove “lost profits, lost royalties, loss of time and 
money expended, and other remedial costs.”154  With this understanding, 
that this is a non-judgment underlying case, jurisdiction may be seen as 
arising from the issue of claim-scope, raising a substantial question of 
patent law necessary for the resolution of the malpractice case.  In the 
context of the malpractice case, the issue of claim-scope would seem to 
fall within the breach (standard of care) element of whether a reasonable 
patent attorney would have employed an “open” rather than a “closed” 
transition, presuming the drafting attorney had a duty to include claims 
of “reasonable” scope and that such claims with “open” transition would 
have been granted to establish the causation element to the loss of the 
license agreement.  Thus, it may be inferred that the breach element in 
the malpractice case raised a significant question of patent law sufficient 
to grant federal jurisdiction independent over any requirement that 
infringement be established. 
Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr,155 decided in 2009 by the 
Federal Circuit (opinion by Judge Laurie, joined by Judges Gaharsa and 
Prost), dealt with the issue of personal jurisdiction: 
 150. See Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Field, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 
1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 151. See Immunocept II, 504 F.3d at 1283. 
 152. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37. 
 153. Immunocept II, 504 F.3d at 1285-86. 
154. See Immunocept I, No. A-05-CA-334-SS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96912, at *4 (W.D. Tex. 
Mar. 24, 2006). 
 155. Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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The question presented in this case is one of first impression, viz., 
whether the act of filing an application for a U.S. patent at the USPTO 
is sufficient to subject the filing attorney to personal jurisdiction in a 
malpractice claim that is based upon that filing and is brought in 
federal court.156
The plaintiff retained a Canadian intellectual property firm to obtain 
patent protection in Canada and other countries, including the United 
States.157  The defendant firm filed a Canadian patent application, which 
included the source code required in the invention to enable it, and the 
Canadian patent subsequently issued.158  However, the source code was 
omitted from the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application that was 
filed in the United Kingdom and, subsequently, in the national phase in 
the United State Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), located in 
Alexandria, Virginia.159  The plaintiff sought to enforce the U.S. patent, 
which subsequently issued, but it was held invalid due to 
“indefiniteness” based on the absence of the source code.160  Plaintiff 
then brought a malpractice action against the Canadian firm in the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which dismissed the 
case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant firm who had 
not entered Virginia.161
The Federal Circuit reversed on the basis of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(k)(2).162  The first requirement of this rule is that plaintiff’s 
claim arises under federal law.163  In this instance, the court easily finds 
“arising under” jurisdiction stating: 
Just as in Immunocept, this case concerns state malpractice claims that 
involve analysis of patent claims and proof of invalidity.  Touchcom 
will be required to show that, had appellees not omitted a portion of 
the source code from its application, the resulting U.S. patent would 
not have been held invalid.164
The court cites Virginia law as requiring proof of “but for” causation “by 
conducting a trial within trial.”165  Thus, for the plaintiff to prevail in the 
 156. Id. at 1409. 
 157. Id. at 1407. 
 158. Id.
 159. Id. at 1408. 
 160. Id.
 161. Id.
 162. Id. at 1418. 
 163. Id. at 1412.  
 164. Id. at 1413. 
 165. Id. (citing White v. Morano, 452 S.E.2d 856, 858 (Va. 1995)). 
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malpractice case, it would have to prove that, but for the absence of the 
source code, the patent would not have been found invalid and would 
have been infringed.166 Immunocept does “involve analysis of patent 
claims,” but does not require “proof of invalidity” for plaintiff to prevail 
because the plaintiff alleges damage not because the “closed” transition 
claims were invalid, but because they were too narrow for successful 
licensing.167  In Touchcom, however, the judgment model is followed, as 
the plaintiff is claiming that it would have obtained a favorable judgment 
of infringement but for the negligent conduct of the defendants in failing 
to include the source code rendering the patent invalid.168  As the subject 
matter jurisdiction and malpractice cases have common elements, case-
within-a-case-within-a-case appears to be explanatory.169
In Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A.,170 decided on March 2, 2010, 
the Federal Circuit (opinion by Judge Moore, joined by Judges Newman 
and Bryson) for the first time considered in certain issues of substantive 
patent malpractice law in addition to the jurisdictional issue.171  The case 
arose in 2003, when the plaintiff contacted the defendant patent attorney, 
who then was employed by the defendant patent law firm, concerning 
patent protection on her inventions, including international patent 
protection.172  The attorney responded, providing general information 
with respect to the PCT, but did not mention the “absolute novelty” rule 
applicable in many foreign countries regarding public use novelty 
bars.173  It appears that the plaintiff publicly used her inventions in 
2005.174
On January 20, 2006, the plaintiff filed two provisional applications 
in the PTO.175 She did not contact the defendant attorney again until five 
days before the critical date for the filing of non-provisional and PCT 
applications.176  The patent attorney advised plaintiff that he was going 
on vacation the following day and would not return until Monday (the 
last date to file), and that she should forward to him immediately 
 166. See id.
 167. Immunocept II, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh’g denied, 2006-1432, 2007 
U.S. App. LEXIS 26823 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2007). 
 168. Touchcom, 574 F.3d at 1408.  
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 122-29. 
 170. Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 171. Id. at 1357. 
 172. Id.
 173. Id.
 174. Id. at 1357-58. 
 175. Id. at 1357. 
 176. Id. at 1358. 
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information concerning these applications.177  The attorney returned on 
Monday and proceeded to prepare three non-provisional applications 
based upon plaintiff’s provisional applications and was able to file these 
applications with the PTO on that day.178  However, he did not file any 
PCT applications.179  The attorney explained to the plaintiff that she 
would be unable to obtain patent protection in Europe under the PCT 
and that it was not worth spending the money to file the PCT 
applications.180  Subsequently, the defendant attorney withdrew his 
representation of the plaintiff, and thereafter the U.S. patent applications 
were abandoned.181  As a consequence, plaintiff asserts “that because 
her inventions lacked patent protection her investors withdrew their 
funding, particularly leaving her unable to operate the website as a 
business.”182
A complaint was filed by plaintiff against the patent firm and the 
patent attorney in an Ohio state court alleging malpractice in failing to 
file PCT applications based upon plaintiff’s inventions.183
Subsequently, plaintiff amended this complaint to allege “defendants 
committed malpractice by failing to file the three PCT applications as
well as by other omissions.”184  Shortly thereafter, defendants removed 
the action to the federal district court maintaining that the “other 
omissions” in the amended complaint would include claiming 
negligence in preparing and then filing the U.S. applications, which thus 
raised substantial questions of patent law under § 1338(a).185  Plaintiff 
testified during her “deposition that these ‘other omissions’ related 
largely to [the attorney’s] alleged negligence in preparing and filing the 
U.S. applications.”186  After discovery, defendants moved for summary 
judgment of dismissal, which was granted by the district court.187
Plaintiff appealed to the Federal Circuit.188
The Federal Circuit first dealt with the subject matter jurisdiction 
question.189  To resolve this question, the court reasoned that, because 
 177. Id.
 178. Id.
 179. Id.
 180. Id.
 181. Id.
 182. Id.
 183. Id. at 1358-59. 
 184. Id. at 1359 (emphasis added). 
 185. Id.
 186. Id. at 1360. 
 187. Id. at 1359. 
 188. Id.
 189. Id.
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the legal malpractice claim arose under Ohio law, the court must 
determine “whether patent law is a ‘necessary element’ of a claim
presented in her complaint.”190  Plaintiff’s contention was that she was 
using alternative theories for the single claim of legal malpractice and 
hence federal jurisdiction should be denied under Christianson VI, which 
held “a claim supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not 
form the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction unless patent law is essential to 
each of those theories.”191  The court, however, rejected the single claim 
theory, quoting the definition of a claim “as broadly defined” in Black’s 
Law Dictionary as the “aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right 
enforceable by a court.”192  Accordingly, the court concluded that the 
plaintiff made two claims:  The first claim is with respect to the failure 
to file the PCT applications, with the court concluding, “It is undisputed 
that Ms. Davis’s allegations relating to the PCT applications do not raise 
any issue of U.S. patent law.”193   However, the second claim for “other 
omissions,” which plaintiff maintained was due to negligence in the 
“preparation and filing of the U.S. applications” does.194  With respect to 
the “other omissions” claim as authorizing federal jurisdiction, the court 
turned to what it refers to as “Ohio’s ‘case-within-a-case’ doctrine,” 
stating, “This doctrine applies in certain malpractice cases to require the 
plaintiff to prove that she would have been successful in the underlying 
matter but for the alleged malpractice.”195  The court then discussed two 
Ohio cases, Vahila v. Hall196 and Environmental Network Corp. v. 
Goodman Weiss Miller, L.L.P.197
In Vahila, the plaintiffs’ allegation of negligence was that the 
defendants had not fully disclosed to them various proposed plea 
bargains and settlement arrangement and had caused the plaintiffs to 
enter into them due to duress and coercion.198  The Ohio Supreme Court 
found one of its previous cases, Krahn v. Kinney,199 particularly 
relevant, where the defendant attorney had failed to disclose a plea 
bargain to a client where criminal charges would have been dismissed, 
and the court held that the fact that the client may not have prevailed in 
 190. Id. (emphasis added). 
 191. Id. at 1360 (quoting Christianson VI, 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988)). 
 192. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 264 (8th ed. 2004)). 
 193. Id.
 194. Id.
 195. Id.
 196. Vahila v. Hall, 674 N.E.2d 1164 (Ohio 1997). 
 197. Envtl. Network Corp. v. Goodman Weiss Miller, L.L.P., 893 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio 2008). 
 198. Vahila, 674 N.E.2d at 1169. 
 199. Krahn v. Kinney, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989). 
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the underlying case did not preclude recovery in a malpractice case 
against the attorney.200  In rejecting imposing a mandatory requirement 
on a malpractice plaintiff, the Vahila court stated: 
In this regard, we reject any finding that the element of causation in the 
context of a legal malpractice action can be replaced or supplemented 
with a rule of thumb requiring that a plaintiff, in order to establish 
damage or loss, prove in every instance that he or she would have been 
successful in the underlying matter(s) giving rise to the complaint.201
As policy justification for this holding, the court stated:  “[W]e cannot 
endorse a blanket proposition that requires a plaintiff to prove, in every 
instance, that he or she would have been successful in the underlying 
matter.  Such a requirement would be unjust, making any recovery 
virtually impossible for those who truly have a meritorious legal 
malpractice claim.”202  The Federal Circuit, however, qualifies the 
breadth of this justification by quoting from Vahila:  “[T]he requirement 
of causation often dictates that the merits of the malpractice action 
depend upon the merits of the underlying case.  Naturally, a plaintiff in a 
legal malpractice action may be required, depending on the situation, to 
provide some evidence of the merits of the underlying claim.”203
The Federal Circuit then turns to a 2008 decision of the Ohio 
Supreme Court, Environmental Network,204 and relies upon how that 
court distinguished Vahila:
In Environmental Network, the appellees alleged that their attorneys 
had coerced them into settling the case.  As their sole claim for 
recovery, the appellees argued that they would have obtained a better 
result if the case had been tried to conclusion. . . . The court observed 
that “unlike the plaintiffs in Vahila, who sustained losses regardless of 
whether their underlying case was meritorious,” the appellees could 
prove causation and damages only if they established that “they would 
have succeeded in the underlying case and that the judgment would 
have been better than the terms of the settlement.”205
The Federal Circuit then concluded that the plaintiff’s malpractice case 
here is analogous to the issue in Environmental Network, stating, 
200. Vahila, 674 N.E.2d at 1167-68. 
 201. Id. at 1168. 
 202. Id. at 1170. 
 203. Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Vahila, 674 N.E. at 1170).  
 204. Envtl. Network Corp. v. Goodman Weiss Miller LLP, 893 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio 2008). 
 205. Davis, 596 F.3d at 1361 (quoting Envtl. Network, 893 N.E.2d at 177-78).   
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“Unless plaintiff would have received patents on her inventions if the 
applications had been competently drafted, that is, unless her inventions 
were patentable, the patent attorney’s negligence would not have caused 
her to suffer any damages.”206  This conclusion is consistent with the 
plaintiff’s allegation of damages:  “[B]ecause her inventions lacked 
patent protection her investors withdrew their funding, leaving her 
unable to operate The IP-Exchange as a business.”207
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit court concluded that, because the 
plaintiff would have had to prove that she would have obtained patents 
on her inventions but for the attorney’s negligence, this raised a 
substantial question of federal patent law and granted subject matter 
jurisdiction to the court under § 1338(a).208  This analysis of jurisdiction 
would appear to raise the substantial question of patent law in the 
causation element of the malpractice claim.  The court does not address 
the damage element, apparently presuming damage from the failure to 
obtain patents.209  Thus, it would appear that the court is following a 
non-judgment model, leaving it to plaintiff to prove actual damages of a 
non-judgment type in the malpractice case but resolving the 
jurisdictional question on the causation element, raising a significant 
question of patent law.210
With respect to evidentiary questions, the Federal Circuit applied 
the law of the regional circuit, in this case the Sixth Circuit, which uses 
an abuse of discretion standard.211  Plaintiff’s patent expert had stated in 
a deposition that he had not undertaken a patentability analysis; 
however, in support of a motion for partial summary judgment, the 
expert had stated that “the patentability of an invention can be and 
routinely is performed without knowing what claims will eventually be 
made . . . [or] issue in a patent on that invention.”212  On the basis of 
 206. Id.    
 207. Id. at 1358.  However, had damages been framed in terms that the funding was withdrawn 
because of the abandonment of the applications and the loss of patent pending status, Vahila would 
seem to raise the question whether the ultimate patentability of plaintiff’s inventions was necessary 
for recovery.  Id.  If so, then federal jurisdiction could be questioned unless there is a substantial 
question of patent law raised without a determination of patentability.  Id.  Certainly, patent 
applications may have value even if they ultimately prove unpatentable.  Id.  A classic example of 
this is Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979), where the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the licensor of the patent application on a keyholder could continue to receive royalties even 
after the application had been abandoned. 
 208. Davis, 596 F.3d at 1361-62. 
 209. Id. at 1361. 
 210. Id. at 1361-62. 
 211. Id. at 1362. 
 212. Id.
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such a patentability analysis, the expert concluded that plaintiff’s 
inventions were patentable.213  The district court struck this section from 
the expert’s affidavit, and the Federal Circuit affirmed on the basis that 
this was not an abuse of discretion based on the inconsistent deposition 
testimony and the failure to include any patentability opinion in his 
original expert report.214
In affirming the grant of a summary judgment, the Federal Circuit 
also followed the law of the regional circuit and quotes from a Sixth 
Circuit case:  “[c]onclusory statements unadorned with supporting facts 
are insufficient to establish a factual judgment.”215  In the Davis case, 
the plaintiff’s expert patent attorney had not undertaken a patentability 
study of the U.S. application but had only opined that the plaintiff would 
have been granted patents but for defendant patent attorney’s 
negligence.216  The court found these statements to be conclusory and 
affirmed the grant of summary judgment for failure to introduce 
evidence sufficient to raise a material issue of fact.217  By deciding the 
summary judgment issue on the causation element of the malpractice 
case, the court avoided the damage element, which could be a significant 
obstacle in this and many cases.218  It should also be noted that the court 
also held that “the case-within-a-case doctrine applies to [plaintiff’s] 
malpractice claim relating to the PCT applications.”219  Because 
plaintiff’s expert offered no evidence concerning the patentability of 
these applications, the grant of summary judgment by the district court 
was appropriate.  Presumably, federal jurisdiction over the “PCT claim” 
 213. Id.
214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 1364 (quoting Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 560 (6th Cir. 2009)).  
 216. Id. at 1362. 
 217. Id. at 1364. 
 218.  As stated in MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 21:3 (speculative damages): 
  The rule is that an attorney is not liable for a damage claim that is remote or 
speculative.  A related, but different issue, is whether the causal relationship between the 
alleged error and damages is speculative.  The test of whether damages are remote or 
speculative has nothing to do with the difficulty in calculating the amount but concerns 
the more basic question of whether there are any damages, which focuses on the fact of 
damages, rather than the amount.  Analytically, the inquiry is for causation, i.e. whether 
the attorney’s conduct caused any injury.  
  Thus, there must be the fact of present injury.  The mere possibility, or even 
probability, that the plaintiff will sustain an injury at some time does not alter the 
speculative nature of the damage claim, and, therefore, does not support a cause of action 
for legal malpractice for that damage claim.  Of course, the plaintiff can pursue those 
damages claims that are not speculative. 
See A. Samuel Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice: An Oxymoron No More, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL’Y 1, 44-49 (2004) (discussing the damage element in patent attorney malpractice cases). 
 219. Davis, 596 F.3d at 1363 (emphasis added). 
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was based upon supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a),220
parasitic to the “other omissions” claim arising under § 1338(a). 
On March 11, 2010, nine days after Davis was decided, the Federal 
Circuit in a split decision, Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. 
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. (Lab. Corp. IV),221 (opinion by Judge 
Gaharsa, joined by Judge Moore, Judge Dyk dissenting) seemingly 
backed somewhat away from a broad interpretation of what constituted a 
significant question of federal patent law in a licensing case.222
Metabolite, the licensor, had prevailed in a previous case against 
LabCorp, the licensee, with a holding that the licensed patent had been 
infringed by the licensee’s medical assays and hence the license was 
breached and terminated.223  This decision was affirmed by the Federal 
Circuit.224  LabCorp then outsourced the assays to be performed by a 
licensed third party under the patent and brought a declaratory judgment 
against Metabolite to confirm the legality of this under the judgment in 
effect.225  The district court granted a summary judgment to LabCorp on 
the basis that the license had been terminated,226 and Metabolite 
appealed to the Federal Circuit, moving for dismissal or transfer of the 
appeal to the Tenth Circuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.227
The majority of the court agreed with the licensor that it did not 
have jurisdiction based on its interpretation of Grable:
  Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Grable, addressing 
general federal question jurisdiction refined the Christianson two-part 
test for § 1338 jurisdiction by requiring a determination of whether “a 
state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually 
disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without 
 220. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006) (“Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly 
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so 
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case 
or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”).    
 221. Lab. Corp IV, 599 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 222. See id. at 1279. 
 223. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings (Lab. Corp. I), 370 F.3d 1354, 1372 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 224. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings (Lab. Corp. II), No. 99-CV-870, 
2001 WL 34778749 (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2001).   
 225. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. (Lab. Corp. III), 571 F. Supp. 2d 
1199, 1204 (D. Colo. 2008). 
 226. Id. at 1215.  
 227. Lab. Corp. IV, 599 F.3d 1277, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state 
judicial responsibilities.228
With respect to Air Measurement and Immunocept, the court concluded: 
Such cases are distinguishable because the instant matter does not 
present a “case[-]within[-]a[-]case.”  Here, it is undisputed that the 
post-trial conduct falls within the scope of the [licensed] patent.  While 
the finding of breach is based on a finding of infringement, the district 
court would not have to conduct an infringement analysis because [the 
original case] established infringement and neither party contests that 
decision.229
The dissent disagreed that there was no “actually disputed and 
substantial” federal question in that there had not been a determination 
by the court that outsourced assays are covered by the patent and the res 
judicata effect of the prior decision, and, moreover, once jurisdiction has 
been established, it is not deprived of jurisdiction because the federal 
issue becomes undisputed.230
In any event, upon transfer from the Federal Circuit, the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment231 concluding: 
On appeal, Metabolite advances several arguments suggesting that the 
License Agreement was never properly terminated: 
  Regardless of the strength of these arguments, we conclude that 
Metabolite is estopped from making them.  What Metabolite once 
called a “termination,” it now attempts to relabel a mere “breach.”  But 
the first jury found termination, at Metabolite’s urging and to 
LabCorp’s detriment, and that finding binds us.  Metabolite cannot 
have its cake and eat it too.  Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.232
Needless to say, no question of patent law, substantial or not, was 
involved in this resolution, and certainly there was no need for the use of 
case-within-a-case methodology. 
In April 2010, the Federal Circuit (opinion by Judge Bryson, joined 
by Judges Archer and Prost) also declined jurisdiction in Clearplay, Inc. 
v. Abecassis,233 which involved a dispute over a license agreement 
 228. Id. at 1282 (emphasis added). 
 229. Id. at 1284. 
 230. See id. at 1287-90 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 231. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. (Lab. Corp. V), 410 Fed. App’x 
152, 160 (10th Cir. 2011).  
 232. Id. at 152-53.  
 233. Clearplay, Inc. v. Abecassis, 602 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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entered into by the parties to settle a patent infringement suit.234  Shortly 
after the settlement, the licensor asserted that the licensee had violated 
the agreement and filed a motion in the same district court as the patent 
case was filed to enforce the agreement.235  The licensor also notified 
several retailers selling the licensee’s products that they were not 
licensed and their sale would constitute infringement.236  The licensor 
then brought a diversity action in the same district court, accusing the 
licensor of “tortious interference with a contractual relationship, tortious 
interference with potential advantageous business relationships, breach 
of the license agreement, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices 
Act.”237  The district court held that the license agreement was valid and 
enforceable and granted the licensee a preliminary injunction enjoining 
the licensor from advising the licensee’s customers to the contrary.238
The licensor then appealed to the Federal Circuit and the licensor 
asserted that this court did not have jurisdiction and the appeal should be 
to the Eleventh Circuit.239
The Federal Circuit agreed with the licensee that it did not have 
jurisdiction over this appeal.240  The court reasoned: 
  While it is true that questions of patent infringement are addressed 
at various points in the communications that are at issue in [the 
licensee’s] complaint, and while it is possible that patent law issues 
could arise in the course of litigating any one of [the licensee’s] claims, 
it is equally clear that none of those claims necessarily turns on an 
issue of patent law.  That is, in the case of each asserted claim, there is 
at least one theory of relief that would not require the resolution of a 
patent law issue.241
The court then makes clear the limits and specificity of its jurisdiction: 
  Christianson embraces a distinctly non-holistic approach to “arising 
under” jurisdiction.  It is not enough that patent law issues are in the 
air.  Instead, resolution of a patent law issue must be necessary to 
 234. Id. at 1364. 
 235. Id. at 1364-65. 
 236. Id. at 1365. 
 237. Id.
 238. Id. at 1365-66. 
 239. Id. at 1366. 
 240. Id.
 241. Id. at 1368. 
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every theory of relief under at least one claim in the plaintiff’s 
complaint.  And that is not so in this case.242
The emphasis on the inadequacy of patent law issues that are floating 
somewhere out there “in the air” is reminiscent of famous admonition of 
Justice Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.:  “Proof of 
negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.”243  In the context of 
patent attorney malpractice, the case-within-a-case methodology should 
aid in the identification of specific patent law issues within the required 
elements of the malpractice cause of action and hence filter them out of 
the “air.”244
In Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc. (Carter II),245 decided in May 
2010, the Federal Circuit (opinion by Judge Dyk, joined by Chief Judge 
Michel, Judge Newman concurring and dissenting in part) expanded its 
jurisdictional net to include malpractice claims based upon breach of 
fiduciary duty in addition to those based upon professional 
negligence.246  The federal district court had imposed sanctions under 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on a law firm for 
pleading a federal cause of action based upon breach of fiduciary duty 
under “the Patent Act, the Code of Federal Regulations [‘CFR’], and the 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure [‘MPEP’].”247  The underlying 
rational for the allegation of breach of fiduciary duty was the conflict 
created by defendant firm in representing both the plaintiff and another 
party with respect to the same invention.248  The district court had 
concluded that, because no federal cause of action exists for breach of 
fiduciary duty under federal patent law, the CFR or the MPEP, it did not 
have jurisdiction.249  The Federal Circuit rejected this view of “arising 
under” jurisdiction limited to the first prong of Christianson and held: 
Here, the determination of [the patent attorney’s] compliance with the 
MPEP and the CFR is a necessary element of [the plaintiff’s] 
malpractice cause of action because the CFR and the MPEP establish 
[the patent attorney’s] expected fiduciary duties to his clients.  Count 
 242. Id. at 1369 (emphasis added). 
 243. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (citing SIR FREDERICK 
POLLOCK, POLLOCK’S LAW OF  TORTS 455 (11th ed. 1920)).  Justice Cardozo had also used this 
quotation earlier in Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920) in the context of causation. 
 244. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37. 
 245. Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc. (Carter II), 605 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 246. See id. at 1325. 
 247. Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc. (Carter I), 510 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
 248. Carter II, 605 F.2d at 1322. 
 249. Id. 
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VIII [breach of fiduciary duty] thus involves a substantial question of 
federal patent law and is not frivolous.250
It may be noted that there is no mention of any case-within-a-case 
or of causation or of damages suffered by the plaintiff.251  Pure and 
simple, this is a subject matter jurisdiction case.252  The Federal Circuit 
finds the substantial question of patent law in the fiduciary duty and its 
breach elements.253  This analysis should also follow when the basis of 
the malpractice action is negligence, where plaintiff must allege a duty 
owed and a breach of that duty.254  Hence, a substantial question of 
patent law for jurisdiction purposes can arise, according to the foregoing 
interpretation of Immunocept and Carter, with respect to any element of 
the malpractice case.  However, in all instances, the plaintiff in the 
malpractice case on whatever theory (negligence, breach of fiduciary 
duty, breach of contract, fraud) must prove it suffered actual damages 
causally related to the alleged malpractice by the defendant patent 
attorney, i.e. the case-within-a-case methodology, within a non-
judgment model.255
In January 2011, the Federal Circuit (opinion by Judge Bryson, 
joined by Judges Newman and Prost) decided Warrior Sports, Inc. v. 
Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C.,256 where the facts of the case were quite 
similar to Air Measurement.257  Warrior sued a competitor for 
infringement of its patent in federal district court.258  The competitor 
defended on the ground that the patent was unenforceable because of 
inequitable conduct.259  The trial was bifurcated, with the inequitable 
conduct defense being tried first.260  The infringement case was settled 
prior to a decision on inequitable conduct.261  Thus, the infringement 
issue was never litigated.262  Warrior then filed a malpractice action in a 
 250. Id. at 1325 (footnote omitted). 
 251. See id. at 1323-25. 
 252. See id. at 1325.  
 253. See id.
 254. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 49 cmt. c (2000) (“Most rules applicable to negligence actions also apply to actions for breach of 
fiduciary duty.”).   
 255. See ASTech, LLC v. Husick, 676 F. Supp. 2d 389, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2009).  
 256. Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C. (Warrior II), 631 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 257. See id. at 1369-70. 
 258. Id. at 1369. 
 259. Id.
 260. Id.
 261. Id.
 262. Id.
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Michigan state court against its patent attorneys, alleging damages on 
the basis of “diminished settlement value” and also because of failure to 
timely pay maintenance fees on the patent, which resulted in its lapse.263
By stipulation, the malpractice case was dismissed from the state court 
and refiled in the federal district court.264  Seemingly directly contrary to 
Air Measurement, the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction, 
concluding:  “[T]he issues implicated in the underlying disputes—
maintenance fees and timeliness of reinstatement proceedings—do not 
appear to be matters of importance in the development of patent law.”265
No mention was made by the court of the inequitable conduct defense as 
perhaps raising a significant question of patent law. 
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court following Air 
Measurement stating: 
If the accused products do not infringe the ‘216 patent, then the 
availability of the inequitable conduct defense did not proximately 
cause any harm to Warrior.  That is, to prove the proximate cause and 
injury elements of its tort claim, Michigan law requires Warrior to 
show that it would have prevailed on its infringement claim against 
STX and would have been entitled to an award of damages as a 
result.266
This rationale is indeed the same as Air Management, ignoring that the 
underlying case had been settled and the damages claimed by Warrior 
were for diminished settlement value.267  If the Federal Circuit had dealt 
with the malpractice case for jurisdictional purposes as a “non-
judgment” one rather than as a “judgment” one requiring that the 
malpractice plaintiff Warrior prove infringement of its patent, federal 
jurisdiction would be justified on the inequitable conduct issue, which, if 
established, would render the patent unenforceable—surely a substantial 
question of patent law.268  The evident use of the “case-within-a-case-
within-a-case” for jurisdiction thus forces the plaintiff to prove 
infringement even though it is not claiming infringement damages but 
rather loss of settlement value damages. 
As of the date of this writing, the most recent case decided by the 
Federal Circuit in November 2011 is Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, 
 263. Id.
 264. Id.
 265. Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C. (Warrior I), 632 F. Supp. 2d 694, 699 
(E.D. Mich. 2009).
 266. Warrior II, 631 F.3d at 1372. 
 267. See supra text accompanying notes 119-29.    
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69. 
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LLP,269 as an unpublished or nonprecedental opinion.270 (Opinion by 
Judge O’Malley, joined by Judge Gaharsa, Judge Lourie joining 
Sections I, III, and IV but concurring only in result of Section II.)  
Plaintiff Byrne obtained a patent for an improvement in a string weed 
trimmer, which included a guide having a “generally planar . . . 
surface.”271  After negotiations broke down with Black & Decker, 
plaintiff brought an infringement action in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Kentucky.272  The court granted a directed verdict 
against plaintiff, finding that Black & Decker’s trimmer did not contain 
a generally planar surface.”273  The Federal Circuit affirmed this 
decision, although on a different construction of the “planar” 
limitation.274  Plaintiff then filed a malpractice action against defendant 
patent attorneys in a Kentucky state court.275  Defendant attorneys 
removed the case to the same district court,276 which held that it had 
jurisdiction citing Air Measurement.277  Plaintiff argued that he could 
 269. Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, No. 2011-1012, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127 
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2011). 
 270. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 provides that: 
A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, 
judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: 
(i) designated as “unpublished,” “not for publication,” “non-precedential,” “not 
precedent,” or the like; and 
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007. 
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.  The Federal Circuit Local Rule 32.1(d) states that: 
The court may refer to a nonprecedential disposition in an opinion or order and may look 
to a nonprecedential disposition for guidance or persuasive reasoning, but will not give 
one of its own nonprecedential dispositions the effect of binding precedent.  The court 
will not consider nonprecedential dispositions of another court as binding precedent of 
that court unless the rules of that court so provide. 
FED. CIR. R. 32.1(d).  Other federal circuit courts have also generally held that unpublished opinions 
have no binding precedential value aside from their reasoning and analysis.  See, e.g., Doe v. 
Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1215 n.10 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e are not bound by this 
Court's unpublished decisions”); In re Grant, 635 F.3d 1227, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[U]npublished 
orders like those the amicus cites may be considered persuasive authority, but they do not constrain 
a panel of the court from reaching a contrary conclusion in a published opinion after full 
consideration of the issue.”); United States v. Keith, 559 F.3d 499, 505 (6th Cir. 2009) (Although 
unpublished decisions do not have precedential authority . . . they may be considered for their 
persuasive value in our analysis) (citations omitted).  
 271. Byrne, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *2. 
 272. Byrne v. Black & Decker Corp., No. 2004-262 (WOB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24104, at 
*6 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 27, 2006), aff’d, 235 Fed. App’x 741.  
 273. Id. at *12-15, *18. 
 274. Byrne, 235 Fed. App’x at 746. 
 275. Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, No. 2: 08-102-DCR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
61962 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 13, 2008). 
 276. Id. at *2. 
 277. Id. at *12-13. 
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have been granted claims without the “planar” limitation and offered an 
affidavit by the inventor Byrne setting forth the technical basis for 
this.278  However, the district court granted defendant attorney’s motion 
for summary judgment, sua sponte, concluding that plaintiff inventor did 
not qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art and hence his affidavit 
did not satisfy the requirement of technical expert testimony.279  Plaintiff 
appealed to the Federal Circuit, which reversed the district court finding 
that it had “abused its discretion in striking Byrne’s affidavit without 
identifying the relevant level of skill in the art and without considering 
that inventors normally possess at least ordinary skill in the field of 
invention . . .”280
Judge O’Malley joined by Judge Gajarsa, however, was not willing 
to let the matter rest with the reversal.  In Section II of the opinion, the 
subject matter jurisdiction question was resurrected.281  Plaintiff had 
argued in his brief that “legal malpractice cases that involve only 
hypothetical patent claims” should not be subject to § 1338 federal 
jurisdiction.282  This argument, however, was abandoned by plaintiff in 
his reply brief as being precluded by Federal Circuit precedent.283
Judges O’Malley and Gajarsa nonetheless, sua sponte, found merit in 
this argument but agreed the court was bound by its precedent.284
As precedent, Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A.285 is cited with 
the following parenthetical:  “(finding jurisdiction over a legal 
malpractice action involving missed deadlines in which no patent 
actually issued.)”286  It should be noted that jurisdiction in Davis was not 
granted because of “missed deadlines,” but rather, as explained above,287
because of “other omissions,” including the patent attorney’s “alleged 
negligence in preparing and filing the U.S. applications.”288  The 
“missed deadlines” in Davis were with respect to PCT applications, 
which the court held that it did not have § 1338 jurisdiction:  “It is 
 278. Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, No. 2: 08-102-DCR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
66557 (E.D. Ky. July 30, 2009). 
 279. Id. at *16-17. 
 280. Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 2011-1012, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *1 
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2011). 
 281. Id. at *5-6. 
 282. Id. at *5 (emphasis added). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at *5-6.  Judge Lourie only concurred in the result of Section II. 
 285. Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 286. Byrne, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *13. 
 287. See text accompanying notes 170-220. 
 288. Davis, 569 F.3d at 1360-62. 
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undisputed that Ms. Davis’s allegations relating to the PCT applications 
do not raise any issue of U.S. patent law.” 289
Judge O’Malley then concludes:  
Although we must adhere to our precedent, we believe this court 
should re-evaluate the question of whether jurisdiction exists to 
entertain a state law malpractice claim involving the validity of a 
hypothetical patent, for the reasons discussed below.290
It is not apparent why Judge O’Malley replaced “hypothetical patent 
claims” with “validity of a hypothetical patent.”291
The basis for plea for reevaluation of the jurisdictional scope is the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Grable.292  The basic question raised in 
Grable was whether the assumption of federal jurisdiction would 
“disturb[] any congressionally approved balance of federal and state 
judicial responsibilities.”293  The majority reasons that the balance is 
 289. Id. at 1360. 
 290. Byrne, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *5 (emphasis in original). 
 291. Are these terms being used interchangeably?  Or is “hypothetical patent” intended to 
include “hypothetical patent claims” as a species of the generic “hypothetical patent?  Other 
questions also are raised.  For example, Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump, 504 F.3d 1262 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 82-129) would appear to fall within the 
Byrne exception because for the plaintiff to prevail, the court would have to determine whether the 
patents would have been enforceable had the defenses been asserted claims and would have been 
infringed.  It would also appear that federal jurisdiction would be denied in Immunocept, LLC v. 
Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussed supra text accompanying 
notes 130-54) because it involved the construction of a hypothetical claim including an open 
transition compared to the actual claim that included a closed transition phrase.  Touchcom, Inc. v. 
Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 155-69) 
may be seen as involving a hypothetical patent including the source code that allegedly was 
negligently not included in the patent held to be invalid.  Davis, 596 F.3d 1355 (discussed supra text 
accompanying notes 170-220) also would involve a hypothetical patent which did not issue because 
of the alleged malpractice of the defendant attorney.  Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc., 605 F.3d 1319 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 245-55) does not seem to involve a 
hypothetical patent or patent claim because the case-within-a-case methodology is not reached, with 
federal jurisdiction being based on the interpretation of the CFR and the MPEP on a conflict of 
interest allegation of violation of the attorney’s fiduciary duty to the client.  In Warrior Sports, Inc. 
v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C., 631 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussed supra text accompanying 
notes 256-68), the last jurisdictional case decided by the Federal Circuit prior to Byrne, an actual 
patent was involved in the underlying infringement case, which was settled prior to reaching the 
infringement issue.  In the malpractice case, the issue to be decided was whether the actual patent 
was infringed and, if so, whether it was unenforceable because of inequitable conduct.  Does this 
make it a hypothetical patent or hypothetical claim because the actual patent could not now be 
infringed by the litigation defendant, who was licensed under the settlement?  On the other hand, a 
finding of inequitable conduct in the malpractice case could have some bearing on the actual patent 
if still in force. 
 292. Byrne, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *6.  See supra text accompanying notes 66-70 
for discussion of Grable.
 293. Byrne, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *5. 
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likely to be disturbed by federal courts deciding malpractice cases 
involving “hypothetical claims” and that such determinations tend to be 
“factbound and situation-specific,” involving  “only application and not 
interpretation of patent law,” and having “little or no bearing on other 
cases.” 294
To support further its application of Grable, the court cites two 
federal district court cases that find limited federal interest in cases 
where no patent issued295 and quoted, evidently with approval, from 
Minton v. Gunn (Minton I),296 a Texas state appellate court, “[W]e 
believe the Federal Circuit misapplied United States Supreme Court 
precedent by disregarding the federalism analysis that the Supreme 
Court has applied to restrict the scope of ‘arising under’ jurisdiction to a 
‘small and special category’ of cases . . . .”).297  The Byrne panel did not 
have access to the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Minton II,
reversing the appellate court.  A detailed analysis of the Texas Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Minton II appears below.298
Byrne then petitioned for en banc rehearing by the Federal 
Circuit.299 This was denied with Judge Dyk writing an opinion 
supporting the denial, with whom Judges Newman and Lourie joined; 
Judges Bryson, Linn, Prost, and Reyna also were in favor of denial; 
Judges O’Malley dissented from the denial of the petition, writing an 
opinion joined by Judge Wallach; in addition, Chief Judge Rader and 
Judge Moore dissented from the denial.  Thus, rehearing was denied by a 
vote of seven to four.  
Judge Dyk supported denial of the petition asserting that the court’s 
prior decisions in upholding federal jurisdiction were fully consistent 
with Christiansen and “within the meaning of Grable,” concluding:  “In 
so holding, we have recognized the strong federal interest in patent law 
uniformity as manifested by Congress’s decision to give exclusive 
jurisdiction to the federal district courts and on appeal to this court.”  He 
so concludes:  “The existence of these issues necessarily makes the 
issues ‘substantial’ within the meaning of Christianson, . . . and 
indicates a ‘serious federal interest’ in federal adjudication within the 
 294. Id. at *5 (citing Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700-01 
(2006)).  
 295. Id. at *6 (citing Genelink Biosciences, Inc. v. Colby, 722 F. Supp. 2d 592, 598-99 (D.N.J. 
2010); Roof Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Hill, 679 F. Supp. 2d 749, 754 (N.D. Tex. 2010)).  
 296. Minton I, 301 S.W.3d 702 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d, 355 S.W.3d 634. 
 297. Byrne, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *16-17 (quoting Minton I, 301 S.W.3d at 709). 
 298. Minton II, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011).  See infra text accompanying notes 379-97. 
 299. Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, No. 2011-1012, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6021
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2012) (per curiam). 
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meaning of Grable . . .”300  In addition, Judge Dyk raises the federal 
interest in regulating attorney practice before the PTO and the federal 
courts in patent matters, concluding:  “There is a substantial federal 
interest in preventing state courts from imposing incorrect patent law 
standards for proceedings that will exclusively occur before the PTO and 
the federal courts.”301
In her vigorous twenty-eight page dissent to the denial of en banc 
rehearing, Judge O’Malley would appear to set the stage for a petition 
for certiorari to the Supreme Court signaling:  “Rather than force the 
Supreme Court to correct our jurisdictional mistakes, we should take this 
opportunity to do so ourselves.”302
Her argument basically is that the Federal Circuit’s “reading of 
Christianson is wrong,”303 and that the following four elements from 
Grable must be satisfied before federal jurisdiction may be asserted: 
[W]hether:  (1) a federal issue is a necessary element of a state law 
claim; (2) a federal issue is actually disputed; (3) a federal issue is 
substantial; and (4) exercising federal jurisdiction will disturb the 
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.  In choosing to 
exercise jurisdiction over malpractice claims arising out of patent 
matters, we have ignored the latter two parts of the inquiry.304
With regard to resolving the “substantiality” element, Judge O’Malley 
offers the following “considerations”305:
As to substantiality of the federal issue, the Supreme Court, and 
regional circuit courts applying Supreme Court decisions, have 
identified certain considerations that affect whether a federal issue is 
“substantial”: (1)  if the issue is a “pure question of law,” rather than 
one that is “fact-bound and situation-specific”; (2) the federal 
government’s interest in the issue, including whether it implicates a 
federal agency’s ability to vindicate its rights in a federal forum and 
whether resolution of the issue would be controlling in numerous other 
 300. Id. at *4. 
 301. Id. at *7.  
 302. Id. at *10 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).  Subsequently, Judge O’Malley dissented in a similar 
denial of en banc rehearing in Memorylink Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 2010—1533, 2012 LEXIS 
U.S. App. 7292 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 2012). 
 303. Id. at *9. 
 304. Id. at *9-10 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 
308, 314 (2005)). 
 305. Citing in support of these considerations:  Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. 
McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700-01 (2006) (analyzing Grable, 545 U.S. at 313); Adventure Outdoors, 
Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1299-1301 (11th Cir. 2008); Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 
501 F.3d 555, 570 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
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cases; and (3) if resolution of the federal issue is dispositive of the case 
at hand.306
She then applies these considerations in the context of patent attorney 
malpractice and finds that such cases generally (1) involve the 
application of facts to a particular rule of patent law;307 (2) do not 
involve a federal agency’s powers;308 or (3) have no bearing on other 
cases, and state issues must still be resolved in the case.309
After this analysis, Judge O’Malley concludes:  “In other words, 
the [AMT] panel equated substantiality with whether the federal issue 
would actually need to be resolved in the context of the state law claim.  
As the discussion above demonstrates, the analysis in AMT is not only 
incomplete, it is incorrect.”310
She then turns to the “federalism” issue:  “Our case law conflicts 
with Supreme Court precedent in another way as well.  As noted above, 
Grable also requires courts to consider whether a state law claim is one 
‘which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any 
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial 
responsibilities.’”311  She frames the problem in terms of finding federal 
jurisdiction in every malpractice case involving a question of patent law:  
“As the Fifth Circuit noted in Singh, the argument for extending federal 
jurisdiction over malpractice claims involving a federal issue ‘reaches so 
broadly that it would sweep innumerable state-law malpractice claims 
into federal court.’”312  Such extension, she asserts, would conflict with 
Grable.  However, as will be discussed below,313 Singh involved 
trademark malpractice, and the Fifth Circuit has subsequently found 
federal jurisdiction in a patent malpractice case, USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery 
Dennison Corp.314  Judge O’Malley dismisses USPPS:  “The Fifth 
 306. Byrne, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6021 at *29. 
 307. “In short, the patent-related malpractice claims over which we have extended our 
jurisdictional reach require only application of patent laws to the facts of a case, and they do not 
implicate the ‘validity, construction, or effect’ of the patent laws.”  Id. at *31. 
 308. “Unlike in Grable, these cases also do not present situations that require courts to 
determine whether an action of a federal agency complied with a federal statute.”  Id. at *33-34.  
However, if validity of a patent is involved in a malpractice case, the compliance of the PTO with 
the patent statute is likely to be in issue. 
 309. The duty and breach issues will generally require the application of state malpractice law.  
See id. at *9.  
 310. Id. at *37. 
 311. Id. at *38 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 
314 (2005)). 
 312. Id. at *39 (citing Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 2008)). 
 313. See text accompanying notes 327-34. 
 314. USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274, 280-82 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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Circuit’s analysis in USPPS is erroneous for the same reasons our case 
law is incorrect.  The USPPS case also demonstrates that our case law 
continues to upset the federalism balance by extending federal question 
jurisdiction to cases even beyond those asserting traditional malpractice 
claims.”315
To reach the proper balance between federal and state interest, 
Judge O’Malley maintains that:  “But we must be mindful of the fact 
that the patent issues in these cases are only incidental to the state law 
tort claim, and that states have at least an equally strong interest in 
adjudicating allegations of attorney negligence.  Accordingly, simply 
reciting a federal interest in patent law uniformity is not enough.”316  To 
buttress this conclusion, she quotes from the dissent in a Texas Supreme 
Court case, Minton v. Gunn317:  “under the Federal Circuit’s approach, 
the federalism element is simply an invocation of the need for 
uniformity in patent law.”318  The majority of the Texas Supreme Court, 
however, applied the four prongs of the “Grable test,” paying particular 
attention to “substantiality” and “federalism,” and found federal 
jurisdiction in the patent malpractice case.  The Minton case will be 
discussed below. 
Judge O’Malley concludes her dissent with a rather cryptic 
sentence:  “Today, we have missed an important opportunity to correct 
our case law and to acknowledge that our reading of Christianson, even 
if once arguably justified, can no longer be so.”319  According to her 
analysis of Christianson in view of Grable, it is not apparent how Air 
Measurement (AMT) and Immunocept and their progeny could be “once 
arguably justified.”  Nonetheless, it does appear that her reading of 
Christianson and Grable would divest federal courts from jurisdiction in 
substantially, if not all, patent attorney malpractice cases and sweep 
them back into state courts.
 315. Byrne, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6021 at *27 n.5.  In USPPS, the Fifth Circuit transferred 
the appeal to the Federal Circuit. 647 F.3d at 275-76.  In a per curium decision, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Avery Dennison.  
USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., No. 2011-1525, 2012 WL 1292886, at *1.  Judge Prost 
concurred indicating that “Our jurisdiction over this case is not disputed . . . .“  Id. at *7.  Stating 
that their concurrence was based on Federal Circuit precedent and indicating that the precedent 
should be revisited, Judge O’Malley concurred in the decision, and Judge Mayer joined.  Id.
 316. Id. at *46.  
 317. Minton II, 355 S.W.3d 634, 652 (Tex. 2011). 
 318. Byrne, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6021 at *46 (quoting Minton II, 355 S.W. at 652 (Guzman, 
J., dissenting)). 
 319. Id. at *50-51 (emphasis added). 
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The use of a “hypothetical patent claim” or “hypothetical patent” 
categorization as a surrogate for jurisdictional determination as 
suggested in the panel decision in Byrne appears to be abandoned in the 
en banc dissent in favor of a generalized exclusion of patent attorney 
malpractice cases from federal jurisdiction on the basis “substantiality” 
and “federalism.”  In a footnote, Judge O’Malley refers to the problem 
of “hypotheticality” in the context of the case-within-a-case analysis of a 
patent malpractice case: 
In virtually every patent-related malpractice action that requires a 
“case[-]within[-]a[-] case” analysis, there will be a hypothetical patent 
issue raised—i.e., in a world where no malpractice occurred, would the 
patentee have fared better, for example, in its patent application or 
infringement suit?  In that sense, the patent issue in any malpractice 
action will involve only an academic inquiry into what likely would 
have happened absent the attorney negligence, and the answer will 
affect only the result of the state law claim, not the rights or scope of 
any live patent.320
Of course, all legal malpractice cases involving a case-within-a-case 
analysis are inherently hypothetical, because the aggrieved client is 
alleging a hypothetical better outcome that did not occur but for the 
alleged malpractice of its attorney.  
3. Synopsis of Federal Circuit Jurisdictional Cases 
A number of conclusions may be seen as following from an 
analysis of the foregoing Federal Circuit cases relating to jurisdiction in 
patent attorney malpractice cases.  First, the court has taken an 
expansive view of its jurisdiction and the scope of what constitutes a 
significant question of federal patent law as stated in Christianson.
Second, the court has not generally considered Grable as placing 
any significant limitation on its jurisdiction as having a “disruptive 
portent in exercising federal jurisdiction,” in that there is strong federal 
interest in resolving patent issues by a specialized court.  Nonetheless, as 
seen in the license cases (Lab. Corp. and Clearplay), the patent issue 
must be “actually disputed and substantial.”  Recently in Byrne, two 
judges would reconsider the jurisdictional issue.  In the denial of 
rehearing en banc, the number of judges voting to rehear was increased 
to four, with seven not wishing to hear the case en banc.321  The Byrne
 320. Id. at 24-26 n.4. 
 321. The outcome of an en banc rehearing of the jurisdiction issues is far from clear 
considering the prior positions of the judges currently sitting on the Federal Circuit as summarized 
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case may provide a good vehicle for the Supreme Court to address the 
jurisdiction issue in malpractice cases involving questions of patent 
law.322
Third, to resolve the jurisdiction issue, the Federal Court employs 
the case-within-a-case methodology; however, the application does not 
appear to be so far in an entirely coherent manner.  In certain cases it 
appears to be following the judgment model, while in others the non-
judgment model.  For example, in Air Measurement and Warrior Sports,
the underlying cases (infringement) had been settled prior to any 
judgment being entered of infringement, and plaintiffs were claiming 
damages based on “diminished settlement value,”323 yet the court 
appears to require a finding of infringement to establish jurisdiction over 
the malpractice cases.  With these cases may be compared Touchcom,
where plaintiff is claiming loss of an infringement judgment, and the 
court appropriately finds jurisdiction.  
On the other hand, in Immunocept, the court finds jurisdiction in the 
malpractice case without reference to infringement and no indication of 
what damages would have to be proven in the malpractice case.  
Jurisdiction in Davis is found on the basis that plaintiff would have to 
prove in the malpractice case that a patent would have been granted, but 
there is no mention of damages in the form of a judgment.  Also, in 
Carter, based on breach of fiduciary duty as raising a federal issue under 
here:  Chief Judge Michel, who wrote the opinions in AMT and Immunocept, has retired; Judge 
Gaharsa has assumed senior status, had joined Judge O’Malley on the panel in Byrne urging the 
revisiting of the jurisdictional issue, had written the opinion in Lab. Corp., and joined in Touchcom;
Chief Judge Rader dissented from the denial  in Byrne but concurred in both AMT and Immunocept;
Judge Newman was for denial in Byrne, joined in Davis and Warrior Sports and concurred and 
dissented in part in Carter; Judge Lourie was for denial in Byrne, joined in AMT and Immunocept
and wrote the opinion in Touchcom; Judge Bryson was for denial in Byrne, wrote the opinions in 
Clearplay and Warrior Sports, and joined in Davis; Judge Linn was for denial in Byrne; Judge Dyk 
wrote the opinion denying rehearing in Byrne, wrote an opinion in Carter, and dissented in Lab. 
Corp.; Judge Prost was for denial in Byrne, and joined in Warrior Sports; Judge Moore dissented 
from the denial and joined in Carter, but wrote the opinion in Davis; Judge O’Malley wrote the 
dissent from the denial of rehearing in Byrne; Judge Reyna was for denial in Byrne; Judge Wallach 
joined in dissenting from the denial in Byrne.
 322. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court in two cases that would have raised the 
federal jurisdictional issue:  Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, 131 S. Ct. 1472 (2011), and Davis 
v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 131 S. Ct. 118 (2010).  A petition for writ of certiorari has been filed 
in Minton II, Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Gunn v. 
Minton, No. 11-1118, 2012 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1404, at *3 (Tex. Dec. 16, 2011) (citing the 
Federal Circuit’s denial of rehearing and the accompanying opinions in Byrne as evidence of “just 
how misguided the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction standard is” and how “the Federal Circuit is not 
going to correct the problem itself.”). 
 323. See Warrior II, 631 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin 
Gump, 504 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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the CFR and MPEP, there is no mention of possible damages in the 
malpractice case.  Thus, Immunocept, Davis, and Carter, while 
employing the case-within-a-case methodology, appear to follow the 
non-judgment model.    
II. THE CASE-WITHIN-A-CASE METHODOLOGY IN FEDERAL AND STATE 
COURTS
By and large there has been wide, if not universal, acceptance of 
Air Measurement and Immunocept in both federal district and state 
courts.  In this section, some exemplary cases will be reviewed with an 
end to ascertaining the manner in which case-within-a-case methodology 
is used to determine jurisdiction and in resolving the malpractice case.  
Relevant details of these and other cases relating to the methodology 
used and whether the judgment or non-judgment model is adopted are 
included in the Appendix.  
A. Federal Circuit Versus Regional Circuit Tension 
In addition to Christianson, an example of the tension that may 
arise between the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit under  
§ 1338 and regional court of appeals with respect to controversies 
involving intellectual property, including malpractice cases, arose in 
three cases decided by the Fifth Circuit.  In the first case, Scherbatskoy 
v. Halliburton Co.,324 decided in 1997, and not involving malpractice, 
the Fifth Circuit held that it had authority to determine whether the 
district court had jurisdiction under § 1338(a)325 and then concluded that 
the Federal Circuit had exclusive appellate jurisdiction under § 1295 
because the resolution of the underlying patent license dispute would 
require a determination of whether the licensed patent was infringed.326
The second case, Singh v. Duane Morris LLP,327 decided in 2008, 
was a trademark attorney malpractice case, where plaintiff filed suit in a 
Texas state court, alleging that the defendant attorney had “mistakenly 
failed at trial to introduce available evidence that would have 
successfully established secondary meaning.”328  The defendant 
removed the case to the federal district court, which held it had 
 324. Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 325. Id. at 291. 
 326. Id.
 327. Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 328. Id. at 337. 
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jurisdiction and then dismissed plaintiff’s malpractice claim.329  On 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court on the 
basis that it did not have jurisdiction.330  In its application of Grable, the 
court posits:  
[F]ederal question jurisdiction exists where (1) resolving a federal 
issue is necessary to resolution of the state-law claim; (2) the federal 
issue is actually disputed; (3) the federal issue is substantial; and (4) 
federal jurisdiction will not disturb the balance of federal and state 
judicial responsibilities.  Although the first and second elements are 
probably satisfied in this case, the third and fourth are not.331
The court concluded that the federal issue was not substantial 
enough to warrant federal jurisdiction and that the extension of “federal 
jurisdiction over this state-law malpractice claim would upend the 
balance between federal and state judicial responsibilities” in violation 
of the directive of Grable.332  Moreover, the court declined to extend Air 
Measurement because it did not consider the federal/state balance issue 
of Grable and because Air Measurement was a patent case involving 
exclusive federal jurisdiction, and this case involved trademark law.333
The court, however, did qualify its holding: 
It is possible that the federal interest in patent cases is sufficiently 
more substantial, such that it might justify federal jurisdiction.  But we 
need not decide the question before the Federal Circuit, because it is 
not before us.  We conclude only that jurisdiction does not extend to 
malpractice claims involving trademark suits like this one.334
In the third case, USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp.,335 decided 
in 2011, the Fifth Circuit was directly faced with the issue of federal 
jurisdiction in a patent malpractice case, with the issue being finally 
raised by the court in the third appeal in this case: 
This suit, involving state-law claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary 
duty in connection with a patent application, reaches us for a third 
time.  We most recently reversed the district court’s dismissal of the 
case as time-barred at the pleading stage and remanded for further 
factual development.  
 329. Id.
 330. Id. at 336. 
 331. Id. at 338. 
 332. Id. at 339. 
 333. Id. at 340. 
 334. Id.
 335. USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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. . . 
We requested supplemental briefing on the issue of whether exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction rests in the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a) and 1338(a).  After 
reviewing the record, we conclude that this case raises a substantial 
issue of patent law such that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal, and 
we order the appeal transferred to the Federal Circuit.336
In so holding, the court followed Federal Circuit precedent (in particular 
Air Measurement, Immunocept, and Davis): 
Without a valid patent—and indeed, without also showing other 
personalized postage stamps would have infringed on its patent 
(another substantial question of patent law that likely would have to be 
decided)—USPPS has no injury.  USPPS’s claims therefore depend 
upon resolving at least one issue of patent law in its favor.337
The court also recognized the policy rationale of the strong federal 
interest in having uniformity in patent law questions and conformity 
“both to Singh’s requirement of balancing the federal and state interests 
involved and Scherbatskoy’s implicit recognition of the special federal 
interest in patent law.”338  In determining that the Federal Circuit had 
jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit used case-within-a-case methodology in 
finding significant questions of patent law being raised in the resolution 
of the malpractice case to establish any injury on the part of the 
plaintiff.339  However, presumably, it will now be up to the Federal 
Circuit to decide the statute of limitations question under Texas law 
before it will be able to consider any patent law questions.340
B. Courts following Air Measurement/Immunocept 
1. U.S. District Courts 
Tomar Electronic, Inc. v. Watkins,341 decided in 2009 by the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Arizona, provides an example of the 
application of the “judgment” model to the jurisdictional issue, where 
the plaintiff (Tomar) in the malpractice case could prevail against the 
 336. Id. at 275-76. 
 337. Id. at 281. 
 338. Id. at 282. 
 339. Id. at 281. 
 340. See id. at 284. 
 341. Tomar Elec. Inc., v. Watkins, No. 2:09-cv-00170-PHX-ROS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
95573 (D. Ariz. July 23, 2009). 
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defendant patent attorneys whether the hypothetical judgment would be 
found to be of infringement or non-infringement of a competitor’s 
patent.342  In the underlying infringement case, a default judgment of 
infringement was entered against Tomar as a sanction for misconduct 
during the litigation, which included damages for infringement of 
approximately $7.3 million and an injunction on the sale of certain of 
Tomar’s products.343  Tomar filed a malpractice action against the 
defendant attorneys in an Arizona state court that was removed to 
federal court by defendant attorneys.344  In one count of the malpractice 
case, Tomar claimed that the default judgment would not have been 
entered but for the negligence of the defendant attorneys.345  Thus, for 
plaintiff Tomar to prevail in the malpractice case, it would have to 
establish that the patent was not infringed, invalid, or unenforceable, 
which raised a substantial question of patent law justifying federal 
jurisdiction.346  In another count, Tomar alleged that defendant attorneys 
were negligent in the preparation of a “patent infringement opinion 
letter,” which evidently gave an opinion that Tomar did not infringe the 
patent in the underlying litigation.347  The court reasoned that, if the 
patent was not infringed, then the opinion letter was correct and the 
defendants were not negligent.348  However, the infringement judgment 
was entered as a sanction not on the merits; thus, the question of the 
correctness of the opinion raised a substantial question of patent law.349
The defendant attorneys are thus placed in the rather precarious 
position of having to defend, in one count, that the patent was infringed, 
valid, and enforceable, while, in the other count, that the opinion letter 
was correct and the patent was not-infringed, invalid, and/or 
unenforceable.350  This consequence illustrates one of the perils of 
having the same counsel giving the patent clearance opinion and 
representing the accused infringer in the infringement litigation.351
 342. See id. at *5-16. 
 343. Id. at *2. 
 344. Id. at *3. 
 345. Id. at *14. 
 346. Id. at *14-15. 
 347. Id. at *15. 
 348. Id. at *15-16. 
 349. Id.
350. See id. at *14-16.  
 351. Probably the most serious issue raised by having the same lawyer or firm providing the 
opinion and also acting as trial counsel is the potential disqualification of trial counsel under the 
Akron Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 3.7 Lawyer As Witness 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
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In Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften 
E.V. v. Wolf Greenfield & Sacks, PC,352 decided in 2009 by the U.S. 
District Court for Massachusetts, plaintiff asserted two claims against 
defendant attorneys:  (1) conflict of interest for joint representation of 
co-owners of applications before the PTO and seeking removal from 
such representation, and (2) malpractice on a variety of grounds relating 
to prosecution and seeking money damages.353  The court refused to 
remand the case to the state court upon motion by the malpractice 
plaintiff, holding that substantial questions of patent law were raised.354
The court based its jurisdictional finding on the causation element of the 
malpractice claim,355 stating:  “Although the Court finds that removal 
was appropriate under § 1338(a) because of the legal malpractice claim, 
that analysis only applies to Max-Planck’s request for money damages, 
which necessitates an analysis of the ‘causation’ element.”356  However, 
the court goes on to conclude that if money damages had not been 
sought, plaintiff’s seeking a judgment requiring defendant attorneys to 
cease prosecuting the co-owned application and representing the co-
owners would be a matter of state jurisdiction “because there is no 
federal preemption in the area of ethical rules for patent prosecution 
before the USPTO.”357
This case was decided prior to Carter, discussed above, where the 
Federal Circuit found a determination of whether defendant attorney’s 
conduct complied with the MPEP and the CFR as a “necessary element” 
of the malpractice claim and hence raised a significant federal 
question.358  Evidently, Max-Planck based its breach of fiduciary duty 
necessary witness unless: 
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or 
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. 
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm 
is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. 
Another issue that may arise with respect to a lawyer or firm acting in dual capacities is the 
potential waiver of attorney-client privilege or the work-product privilege usually in the context of 
relying upon the advice of counsel to avoid a charge of willful infringement.  See DAVID HRICIK &
MERCEDES MEYER, PATENT ETHICS: PROSECUTION 197-209 (2009) (discussing both issues and 
relevant cases). 
 352. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften E.V. v. Wolf Greenfield & 
Sacks, PC, 661 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 353. Id. at 127. 
 354. Id.
 355. Id. at 130. 
 356. Id.
 357. Id.
 358. See Carter v. Alk Holdings, Inc., 605 F.3d 1319, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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claim on Massachusetts ethical rules.359  In any event, the district court 
found federal jurisdiction in the malpractice count based on errors of 
prosecution, with a general allegation of money damages being 
sufficient, thus indicating the application of the non-judgment model.360
In ASTech International, LLC v. Husick,361 decided by the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 2009, the 
question of federal jurisdiction was not raised362 where the alleged 
malpractice of the defendant attorneys was permitting two provisional 
applications to be abandoned for failure to pay the filing fees and 
misrepresenting the continued pendency of the applications.363
Defendants moved for summary judgment on a variety of grounds, 
including the statute of limitations and the inability of plaintiffs to prove 
actual damages.364  Plaintiff argued that actual damages only had to be 
proved when the case-within-a-case involved litigation,365 citing 
Hackers, Inc. v. Palmer,366 a Pennsylvania decision involving legal 
malpractice.367  The court disagreed and drew a distinction between 
case-within-a-case “methodology” and “terminology”:  “Instead, both of 
those cases have merely recognized that the ‘case-within-a-case’ 
terminology (as opposed to methodology) is inappropriate where the 
alleged malpractice arises outside the context of litigation because, in 
such cases, there is technically no ‘case’ to be proven.”368
It is not apparent from the foregoing analysis of Air Measurement
that the Federal Circuit had “merely recognized . . .the ‘case[-]within[-
]a[-]case’ terminology,” as it stated that case-within-a-case was a 
“requirement” and required plaintiff to establish infringement for 
jurisdiction as opposed to diminished settlement value, which was 
claimed as actual damages.369  The district court, however, makes the 
important recognition that:  “Regardless of whether the method of proof 
is characterized as ‘case-within-a-case,’ ‘transaction-within-a-case,’ or 
 359. See Max-Planck, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 129. 
 360. See id. at 127. 
 361. ASTech Int’l, LLC v. Husick, 676 F. Supp. 2d 389 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 362. Id. at 389. 
363. Id. at 395.  
364. Id. at 396.  
 365. Id. at 401-02. 
 366. Hackers, Inc. v. Palmer, 79 Pa. D. & C.4th 485 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2006). 
 367. Id. at 485.
 368. ASTech, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 402. 
 369. See supra text accompanying notes 81-127. 
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‘patent-prosecution-within-a-case,’ Pennsylvania courts have been very 
clear that plaintiffs in all malpractice actions must prove actual loss.”370
In other words, in the malpractice case, the case-within-a-case 
methodology should be used whether the damage claimed is due to the 
loss of a favorable judgment or other cognizable actual damages.  As 
discussed above, this methodology is also appropriate for analyzing the 
jurisdictional issue.371
Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc. v. Patterson, Thuente, Skaar & 
Christensen, P.A.,372 decided by the U.S. District Court for Minnesota in 
2009, provides an example in a litigation situation of the application of 
the case-within-a-case methodology without imposing a requirement that 
the malpractice plaintiff establish that it would have prevailed in the 
underlying case, but only that it would have obtained a more favorable 
outcome.373  The malpractice plaintiff had been found to infringe a 
patent, and a judgment of $24 million was entered against it.374  Plaintiff 
then brought a malpractice case in a state court against its former 
attorneys in the infringement case, who removed the case to the District 
Court,375 which applied Air Measurement in finding federal jurisdiction:  
[T]he resolution of the legal malpractice action—which is governed by 
Minnesota state law that imposes the same “but for” causation 
requirement as did the law of the state at issue in Air Measurement 
Technologies—will inevitably involve the determination of whether 
Rockwood could have obtained a better outcome in the underlying 
infringement litigation (at least by being held liable for lesser damages 
if not by obtaining a verdict of non-infringement or of invalidity).376
The court thus applied the case-within-a-case methodology to define 
damage as being a more favorable outcome, rather than requiring a 
judgment of non-infringement.377  Hence, the plaintiff could have been 
held to be an infringer and still recover, if it could establish that its 
infringement damages would have been less but for the negligence of its 
attorneys.378
 370. ASTech, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 402. 
 371. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37. 
 372. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc. v. Patterson, Thuente, Skaar & Christensen, P.A., No. 
09-2493 (DWF/FLN), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119349 (D. Minn. Dec. 22, 2009). 
 373. Id. at *10-11. 
 374. Id. at *1. 
 375. Id. at *2. 
 376. Id. at *10-11. 
 377. Id. at *16-17. 
 378. Id. at *13-14. 
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2. State Courts 
A number of state courts seem quite willing to accept the broad 
federal subject matter jurisdiction claim over patent malpractice cases as 
laid out in AirMeasurement/Immunocept.  A leading case among these is 
the recent decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Minton v. Gunn,
decided in December 2011.379  The case is of particular interest because 
of its analysis of the federal/state jurisdiction balance under Grable.
The case originated with plaintiff Minton filing a malpractice claim 
in a Texas court against its former patent attorneys for failure to assert 
the “experimental use” exception against an “on-sale” statutory bar in a 
patent infringement suit.380  The court granted a summary judgment 
against the plaintiff.381  Plaintiff in his appeal argued that the state court 
did not have subject matter jurisdiction.382  The majority of the Texas 
appellate court agreed, holding: 
The federal issue here is not substantial.  Although significant to 
plaintiffs claim, the issue of whether there was evidence of 
experimental use of the technology at issue is predominantly one of 
fact, with little or no precedential value.  Therefore resolution of the 
issue will not require ‘resort to the experience solicitude and hope of 
uniformity that a federal forum offers.’  The courts of this state are 
perfectly capable of deciding cases such as this.383
The court declined to follow Air Measurement and Immunocept,
concluding that the Federal Circuit’s decisions are not binding on the 
Texas court,384 and relied upon Singh, a Fifth Circuit trademark 
malpractice case, discussed above.385  Moreover, the court concluded 
that the Federal Circuit had misapplied Supreme Court precedent with 
regard to “arising under” jurisdiction.386
 379. Minton II, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011). 
 380. Minton I, 301 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Tex. App. 2009), rev’d, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011). 
 381. Id. at 707. 
 382. Id. at 708. 
 383. Id. at 709. 
 384. Id. at 710. 
 385. See id. at 708 (citing Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)). 
 386. Minton I, 301 S.W.3d at 709.  The dissenting judge asserted that the majority elected to 
rely upon Singh, a trademark malpractice case, while disregarding Air Measurement and
Immunocept, which were directly on point.  Id. at 721-22.  Moreover, the majority is seen as 
“put[ting] the cart before the horse” by looking at the state court’s summary judgment evidence, 
rather than referring to the jurisdictional issue under the well-pleaded complaint doctrine.  Id. at 
723.   
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To resolve the jurisdictional issue, the Texas Supreme Court adopts 
what it calls the “Grable test,”387 which was set out in Singh interpreting 
Grable:  “In other words, federal question jurisdiction exists where (1) 
resolving a federal issue is necessary to resolution of the state-law claim; 
(2) the federal issue is actually disputed; (3) the federal issue is 
substantial; and (4) federal jurisdiction will not disturb the balance of 
federal and state judicial responsibilities.”388  The court finds the first 
prong of the test to be satisfied because the experimental use exception 
as a matter of federal patent law must be resolved to determine whether 
the patent was time-barred in order to resolve the state-law malpractice 
claim.389  The second prong was found to be satisfied, as the viability of 
the experimental use exception as a matter of federal law was certainly 
disputed by the parties in the context of the malpractice case.390
Whether the third prong of the Grable test—the substantiality of the 
experimental use issue—is sastified is considered by the court to be a 
closer question.391  However, it concludes that this issue is substantial 
enough to justify federal jurisdiction, reasoning that the “experimental 
use exception presented here is more similar to the substantial federal 
issue presented in Grable [construction of a federal tax statute] than the 
insubstantial issue presented in Empire [federal law preempting state law 
on reimbursement of benefits but state law determining entitlement to 
reimbursement].”392  The court considers the final Grable element—
whether the federal-state jurisdictional balance will be upset—“perhaps 
the most important.”393  To conclude that this element had been 
 387. Minton II, 355 S.W.3d 634, 642 (Tex. 2011). 
 388. Singh, 538 F.3d at 338 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 
545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)). 
 389. Minton II, 355 S.W.3d at 642. 
 390. Id. at 642-43. 
 391. Id. at 643. 
 392. Id.  In the paragraph following this quotation, the court cites a number of federal and state 
court decisions following Grable and supporting federal jurisdiction.  Id. at 643-44.  These include:  
USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274, 280-82 (5th Cir. 2011); Warrior Sports, Inc. v. 
Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C., 631 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Davis v. Brouse McDowell, 
L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Immunocept II, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 
2007), reh’g denied, 2006-1432, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26823 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2007); U.S. 
Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., 
Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 477-78 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, 
Lewis & Bockius, LLP, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).  It is interesting to note, 
however, that the parenthetical following the Davis citation “(holding that a state-based legal 
malpractice action presented a substantial federal patent issue where no patent had actually issued 
because of the attorney's alleged failure to timely file the patent application)” inaccurately reports 
the jurisdictional base in Davis as did the Federal Circuit in Byrne (discussed supra text 
accompanying notes 285-89. 
 393. Minton II, 355 S.W.3d at 644. 
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satisfied, the court relies heavily upon the public policy underlying 
federal court jurisdiction over patents issued by a federal agency, 
including the public interest in having expert and uniform application of 
patent law.394
While the court makes clear that it is not bound by decisions of the 
Federal Circuit,395 it concludes:  “We agree with the Federal Circuit that 
when the validity of a patent is questioned, even if within the context of 
a state-based legal malpractice claim, the federal government and patent 
litigants have an interest in the uniform application of patent law by 
courts well-versed in that subject matter.”396  Nonetheless, it would 
appear that this agreement should be considered within the context of the 
satisfaction of the elements of the Grable test, which would appear to 
offer some scope of state jurisdiction with respect to insubstantial issues 
of patent law.397
TattleTale Portable Alarm Systems, Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & 
Griswold, LLP,398 decided by the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth 
Appellate District, in 2009, affirmed for lack of subject matter 
 394. Id. at 644-45. 
 395. Id. at 640. 
 396. Id. at 646. 
 397. As stated by the court: 
In the future, just as Minton has done, any state litigant asserting a legal malpractice 
action to recover for damages resulting from his patent attorney’s negligence in patent 
prosecution or litigation must also satisfy all four elements of the Grable test to place his 
claim under exclusive federal jurisdiction.  In the context of state-based legal malpractice 
claims, plaintiffs will not always be able to meet such a burden.  See, e.g., Holmes Grp., 
Inc., 535 U.S. at 831 (holding a patent-law counterclaim cannot serve as the basis for 
“arising under” jurisdiction); Thompson v. Microsoft Corp., 471 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding the state-law claim of unjust enrichment did not arise under § 
1338 jurisdiction because the plaintiff could prevail on the claim by showing the 
defendant's unauthorized use of proprietary information without proving inventorship 
under U.S. patent laws); Roof Tech. Servs. v. Hill, 679 F. Supp. 2d 749, 754 (N.D. Tex. 
2010) (explaining that a state legal malpractice action involving an attorney’s “failure to 
meet deadlines and communicate with [his] client” and in which “[p]atent issues are 
merely floating on the periphery,” did not trigger exclusive federal patent jurisdiction); 
Genelink Biosciences, Inc. v. Colby, 722 F. Supp. 2d 592, 601 (D.N.J. 2010) (holding 
that where a state malpractice claim was based on missed deadlines, and not on the 
validity of the actual patent itself, there was no patent issue triggering exclusive federal 
patent law jurisdiction); E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. Moses & Singer, LLP, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
516, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (finding no federal-question jurisdiction where the 
ultimate question in the legal malpractice claim was not the attorney’s negligence in the 
prosecution of the patent, but rather “that the defendant attorneys knew or should have 
known that [the plaintiff] did not have sufficient evidence to support the claims” they 
asserted on its behalf in the underlying litigation.). 
Minton II, 355 S.W.3d at 646-47. 
 398. TattleTale Portable Alarm Sys., Inc. v. Calfee, No. 08AP-693, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 
1217 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2009). 
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jurisdiction the dismissal by the state trial court of plaintiff’s malpractice 
claim against the defendant patent firm for failure to pay maintenance 
fees on one of plaintiff’s patents, resulting in the lapse of the patent and 
the termination of a licensing agreement by a third party.399  Plaintiff 
contended that its malpractice claim only “tangentially” related to 
patents and did “not involve patent infringement, comparison of patent 
applications, or scope of a particular patent,” as required by Immonocept
for federal jurisdiction to arise.400  The court, however, refused to so 
limit Immunocept:  “While Immunocept noted that claims for patent 
infringement, comparison of patent applications, and patent scope 
involve a substantial question of federal patent law and confer Section 
1338 jurisdiction, it did not hold, despite appellant’s assertion to the 
contrary, that these are the only claims that confer such jurisdiction.”401
The defendant firm argued that “each of the key elements of 
appellant’s professional negligence claim, i.e., duty, breach of duty, 
causation, and damages, turn on interpretation of federal patent law.”402
The court agreed that “whether or not the patent had lapsed, and whether 
or not revival/reinstatement should have been sought, require the 
construction and interpretation of federal patent law.”403  This would 
require a resolution in the malpractice action of the duty-breach 
(negligence) element.  Moreover, the court included the damage 
element:  “Also, damages in the case sub judice cannot be determined 
without a determination of patent scope.”404  Causation would follow in 
that:  But for any negligence in the lapse of the patent and its revival, no 
damages would have been sustained by plaintiff.  Damages in the form 
of lost royalties under the license would imply the application of the 
non-judgment model.405  Plaintiff has re-filed the malpractice claim in 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, where it is 
currently pending.406
Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP,407
decided in 2010 by the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate 
 399. Id. at *3-4. 
 400. Id. at *8-9. 
 401. Id. at *11. 
 402. Id. at *9. 
 403. Id. at *12. 
 404. Id.
 405. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35. 
 406. See TattleTale Portable Alarm Sys., Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, 276 F.R.D. 
573 (S.D. Ohio 2011). 
 407. Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
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District, applied Air Measurement and Immunocept retroactively.408
Defendant patent attorneys were retained by Landmark to secure patent 
rights relating to an electronic billboard, with an application being filed 
in January 2002.409  During the course of the prosecution of the basic 
application, the PTO restricted the application to certain claims and 
defendants filed a divisional application for the other claims.410
However, as asserted by plaintiff, the divisional application was 
improperly filed, resulting in plaintiff’s being unable to receive 
protection on all of its inventions.411  Plaintiff alleged that defendants 
concealed from it the problems with the divisional application until 
November 2, 2005.412  Then, plaintiff filed a malpractice action in the 
Santa Clara Superior Court against defendants on November 30, 2005, 
and in its first amended complaint, alleging “legal malpractice, 
negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty,” inter alia, resulting in the loss 
of “valuable and pioneering patent rights.”413  In its answer, one of the 
defendant patent firms raised the defense of lack of state subject matter 
jurisdiction.414  More than two years later, defendants filed a demurrer, 
arguing that plaintiff’s malpractice claim raised substantial questions of 
patent law and hence fell within the exclusive federal jurisdiction under 
§ 1338.415  The Superior Court granted the demurrer.416  Plaintiff 
immediately filed a malpractice action in federal district court, which 
added two further counts of breach of contract and fraud.417  The federal 
court, however, dismissed the complaint as being time barred under the 
California statute of limitations except with respect to the fraud count, 
granting plaintiff leave to amend to plead equitable estoppel against the 
statute of limitations defense.418  Subsequently, the district court refused 
to dismiss the fraud claim on the basis of fraudulent concealment.419
The California Court of Appeals sustained the demurrer of the 
Superior Court, finding that there was a substantial question of patent 
law, applying the reasoning of Air Measurement and Immunocept420 and 
 408. Id. at 378-81. 
 409. Id. at 375. 
 410. Id.
 411. Id. at 376. 
 412. Id.
 413. Id.
 414. Id.
 415. Id.
 416. Id.
 417. Id. at 376-77. 
 418. Id. at 377. 
 419. Id.
 420. Id. at 383. 
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concluding that:  “To recover from respondents, Landmark would have 
to prove that but for their failure to disclose (or intentional concealment 
of) [defendant attorneys’] negligence in filing the ’916 divisional 
application, it would not have lost ‘valuable and pioneering patent 
rights.’”421
The court was not swayed by the “injustice” argument made by 
plaintiff:  
  Landmark protests that affirmance of the judgment here would 
leave it without a remedy.  We cannot provide relief from that 
predicament.  As the district court noted in rejecting Landmark’s claim 
of legal disability, at the time Landmark filed this action there was 
sufficient authority suggesting that federal court would be the proper 
forum for resolution of the issues raised.  (See, e.g., Holiday Matinee, 
Inc. v. Rambus, Inc.422 . . . [substantial patent law issues raised in 
allegations of unfair royalty charges, threatened patent infringement 
litigation, and baseless lawsuits].)  Pennie & Edmonds alerted 
Landmark to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in its answer, only 
two months after the first amended complaint was filed.  Like the 
district court, we are not convinced that Landmark was deprived of its 
ability to file a timely action in federal court.423
Holiday Matinee, decided by this court in 2004, was not a malpractice 
case, but a consumer class action case based on California statutes.424
Air Measurement and Immunocept were not decided until 2007, and 
none of the defendant law firms moved to remove the state malpractice 
case to federal court while the statute of limitations was running.425
After Landmark’s petition for review by the California Supreme 
Court was denied,426 Landmark petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, which was also denied.427  Certiorari was also 
denied in Davis, discussed above.428  If any inference can be drawn from 
the denial of certiorari, it may be that the Court is not prepared, at least 
at this time, to get into the fray of federal/state jurisdictional issues as far 
as patent malpractice cases may lead.  This situation may change as 
 421. Id. at 381. 
 422. Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
 423. Landmark, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 384. 
 424. Holiday, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 767. 
 425. Landmark, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 384. 
 426. Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, No. S182516, 2010 Cal. LEXIS 6858 (Cal. July 14, 
2010). 
 427. Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, 131 S. Ct. 1472 (2011). 
 428. Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 131 S. Ct. 118 (2010). 
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conflicting decisions mount within both federal and state courts, as seen 
in the cases discussed herein and included in the Appendix.  
B. Courts not following or distinguishing  
Air Measurement/ Immunocept 
1. U.S. District Courts 
A number of federal district courts have not been eager to embrace 
the broad scope of Air Measurement/Immunocept.  A few representative 
cases are discussed here.  Others may be found detailed in the Appendix. 
Taylor v. Kochanowski,429 decided by the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan in March 2008, granted plaintiff’s 
motion to remand to the state court, finding that the complaint did not 
require the resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law.430
Defendant attorneys had represented plaintiff in an infringement action 
against Daimler Chrysler and a supplier in the Eastern District.431  The 
court held the patent not infringed, which was affirmed by the Federal 
Circuit.432  Plaintiff then filed a malpractice case against its former 
attorneys in a Michigan state court.433  Defendants removed this case to 
the Eastern District.434  Plaintiff’s allegations of malpractice were:  
“dismissing a party from the case, inadequately representing him in the 
claim against Daimler Chrysler, failing to advise him of his right to 
reinstate his claim against the dismissed party prior to the expiration of 
the statute of limitations, and failing to advise him of the merits of his 
common law claims against the dismissed party.”435  The court appears 
to agree that the case-within-a-case methodology should determine 
jurisdiction, stating:  “Defendants correctly argue that in order to prevail 
in his legal malpractice claim, Plaintiff will have to prove that but for 
Defendants’ negligence, he would have prevailed in his patent suit.”436
Nonetheless, the court then concludes: 
However, in order to prove Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiff will not 
be forced to relitigate the patent issues.  Those were resolved in the 
 429. Taylor v. Kochanowski, No. 07-11867, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20430 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 
14, 2008). 
 430. Id. at *8. 
 431. Id. at *2. 
 432. Id. at *5-6. 
 433. Id. at *2. 
 434. Id.
 435. Id. at *7. 
 436. Id. at *5. 
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underlying action . . . . Therefore, there are no substantial questions of 
federal patent law at issue in this action.  Instead, Plaintiff will have to 
prove the elements of a legal malpractice action, a state law cause of 
action.437
For plaintiff to prevail in the malpractice case, at least with respect to the 
count against the defendants’ inadequate representation against Daimler 
Chrysler, it would seem necessary that plaintiff prove that but for this 
inadequate representation, infringement would have been found in the 
underlying case.438  The court forecloses this possibility, and it is not 
apparent how the state court would deal with the issue of hypothetical 
infringement but for the malpractice of defendants.439
In Roof Technical Services v. Hill,440 decided in January 2010, the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas extended Grable
and rejected Air Measurement in denying federal jurisdiction in a patent 
malpractice action where plaintiff alleged it failed to obtain patent 
protection on its roofing system due to the negligence of the defendant 
attorney.441  Plaintiff filed the malpractice claim in the district court, and 
the court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.442  The court 
reasoned: 
All legal malpractice plaintiffs proceeding on a negligence theory must 
show that, absent their attorney’s negligence, they would have won the 
underlying litigation, consummated the deal, or acquired the patent.  
Thus, every legal malpractice action in which the attorney commits the 
alleged malpractice while handling a federal matter will raise a federal 
issue.  Extending federal jurisdiction to all such actions would 
therefore sweep an entire category of cases, traditionally the domain of 
state courts, into federal court.  After Grable, that result is 
untenable.443
In essence, while the court recognized the case-within-a-case 
methodology for resolving the malpractice claim, it was unwilling to 
extend that methodology to the jurisdictional question.  It would appear 
that failing to obtain a patent is considerably more restrictive than any 
 437. Id. at *5-6. 
 438. Id. at *5. 
 439. It is interesting to note that the Taylor case is not cited in the two district court opinions in 
the Warrior Sports cases, and in Federal Circuit’s opinion reversing the district court.  See
discussion of these cases supra text accompanying notes 257-68. 
 440. Roof Tech. Servs. v. Hill, 679 F. Supp. 2d 749 (N.D. Tex. 2010). 
 441. Id. at 752-53. 
 442. Id. at 754-55. 
 443. Id. at 754. 
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“federal matter” and would seemingly be inconsistent with USPPS, Ltd. 
v. Avery Dennison Corp., recently decided by the Fifth Circuit and 
discussed above.444
On the other hand, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas, in Haase v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols, Sorrels, Agosto & 
Friend, LLP,445 decided in February 2010, appeared willing to accept 
the jurisdictional sweep of Air Measurement/Immunocept.446  However, 
on the basis of the damage claimed by plaintiff, the court concluded that 
this case was distinguishable as no federal question was raised.447
Plaintiff claimed that a sanction judgment was entered against him in an 
infringement case where he was represented by the defendant attorney, 
who allegedly negligently mislabeled tests performed on the accused 
infringing device as being privileged from discovery.448  The court 
remanded the case to state court,449 concluding: 
The issue here will be whether the tests were discoverable—which will 
likely turn on why the tests were done, what product was tested, and 
who saw the tests—not whether the tests demonstrate infringement or 
noninfringement.  Unlike Air Measurement Techs. and Immunocept,
Haase will not have to prove a patent issue to prevail on this claim.  
Accordingly, this claim does not arise under section 1338 and cannot 
be the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction.450
2. State Courts 
As might be expected, certain state courts have been less than eager 
to have their traditional jurisdiction over common law legal malpractice 
cases usurped, even if limited to the esoteric field of patent law.  A 
strong challenge came from the Supreme Court of Nebraska in a patent 
malpractice case arising before Air Measurement/Immunocept but 
ultimately decided after the Federal Circuit had spoken.451
In New Tek Manufacturing v. Beehner (New Tek I),452 the Nebraska 
Supreme Court decided in 2005 that it had jurisdiction over a 
 444. See supra text accompanying notes 335-40. 
 445. Haase v. Abraham, No. 6:09CV547, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11132 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 
2010). 
 446. See id. at *6-7. 
 447. Id. at *10-11. 
 448. Id.
 449. Id. at *19. 
 450. Id. at *11. 
 451. See New Tek Mfg., Inc. v. Beehner (New Tek I), 702 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 2005). 
 452. Id. at 336.   
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malpractice action453 where the defendant attorney was accused of 
negligently allowing plaintiff’s patent to expire and hence losing the 
benefit of a broadened claim in a reissue patent, which would have been 
otherwise infringed by a third party.454  With respect to the patent in 
question and the issue of its hypothetical infringement, the state trial 
court, inter alia, had held a Markman hearing, construed the claims, 
including determining whether mean plus function claims, and applied 
the doctrine of equivalents.455  The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded 
on the jurisdictional issue:  
We conclude that contrary to the defendant’s suggestion, this case is 
not one “arising under” the patent law within the meaning of  
§ 1338(a).  The sole cause of action presented in this case is 
professional negligence.  Patent law is implicated only incidentally, in 
that the measure of New Tek’s alleged damages requires consideration 
of the hypothetical infringement of the [reissue] patent.  But the 
precise question is not whether Orthman Manufacturing infringed on 
the [reissue] patent; rather, the question is whether, absent [defendant 
attorney’s] negligence, New Tek would have been successful in an 
infringement action against Orthman. . . . The construction and alleged 
infringement of the [reissue] patent is relevant only insofar as it helps 
us to determine who would have prevailed in that hypothetical action.  
Simply stated, it is difficult to see how this case arises under federal 
patent law when on the record before us, the only patent that has been 
construed, and of which infringement is alleged, has expired.  The 
federal government has no interest in hypothetical determinations 
regarding an unenforceable patent.456
The court remanded the case to the lower court to reconsider the issue of 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.457
Magnetek, Inc. v. Kirkland & Ellis,458 decided by the Appellate 
Court of Illinois, First District, in 2011, presents a malpractice case 
against a patent firm, which denies federal jurisdiction on the basis of 
collateral estoppel.459  The controversy began in 1998 when the 
underlying infringement case was brought in the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois by the patent owner Nilssen against the 
plaintiff Magnetek, who was represented in the infringement case by 
 453. Id. at 346.  
 454. Id. at 343-44. 
 455. Id. at 344. 
 456. Id. at 346. 
 457. Id. at 355. 
 458. Magnetek, Inc. v. Kirkland & Ellis, 924 N.E.2d 803 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
 459. See id. at 818-19. 
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defendant Kirkland.460  The parties agreed to arbitrate the claim and, as 
part of the settlement agreement, Nilssen agreed not to pursue willful 
infringement and Magnetek agreed not to assert inequitable conduct as a 
defense.461  The arbitration resulted in an award of over $23 million for 
Nilssen, which was settled for $18.75 million.462  It was not until 2008 
that Nilssen petitioned for the certification of the arbitration award in 
federal district court.463  Magnetek, with new counsel, then moved to 
have the arbitration award vacated on the grounds that it had, in the 
meantime, discovered facts that would have rendered the patent in 
question unenforceable based upon the inequitable conduct of 
Nilssen.464  In fact, in an infringement case originally filed in 2001, the 
patent in question (‘409), among others, had been held unenforceable in 
Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc. (Osram I),465 decided by the District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois in 2006, because of inequitable 
conduct, which was affirmed by the Federal Circuit the following 
year.466  Kirkland had represented Osram in the infringement case and 
does not deny that it asserted the inequitable conduct defense on 
Osram’s behalf.467
Nonetheless, the district court refused to vacate the arbitration 
award because Magnetek could not produce clear and convincing 
evidence of the fraud before the Patent Office, and that such evidence 
was not discoverable prior to the arbitration.468  After this decision, 
Magnetek filed a malpractice claim against defendant Kirkland in the 
Circuit Court for Cook County.469  The defendant moved to have the 
case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which was granted 
by the state court, and Magnetek appealed.470  The Illinois Appellate 
Court concluded that the inequitable conduct holding against the patent 
owner Nilssen was governed by the doctrine of collateral estoppel,471
stating: 
 460. Id. at 806. 
 461. Id.
 462. Id.
 463. Id.
 464. Id.
 465. Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc. (Osram I), 440 F. Supp. 2d 884 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 466. See Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc. (Osram II), 504 F.3d 1223, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 467. Magnetek, 924 N.E.2d at 817. 
468. Id. at 807. 
 469. Id. at 808. 
 470. Id. at 806. 
471. Id. at 818-19. 
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The doctrine of collateral estoppel dictates that the final determination 
of the unenforceability of the ‘409 patent applies in the underlying 
lawsuit.  The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have long 
recognized that when a patent has been held to be unenforceable in a 
suit involving one alleged infringer, an unrelated party may rely on 
that unenforceability decision under the principles of collateral 
estoppel.472
Then the court relied upon the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of Grable 
in Lab. Corp. as requiring a “disputed” question of federal patent law: 
  Consequently, as the Federal Circuit discussed in [Lab. Corp.], the 
issue of the unenforceability of the ‘409 patent, based on the defenses 
asserted by Osram and now claimed by Magnetek, “has been resolved 
and is no longer disputed.” [citing LabCorp] While a finding of legal 
malpractice would depend on the unenforceability of the ‘409 patent, 
the circuit court would not have to conduct an independent analysis of 
unenforceability because the district court established, and the Federal 
Circuit affirmed, the merits of that claim and neither party contests 
those decisions. . . . Therefore, there is no “disputed” federal patent 
issue raised by Magnetek’s legal malpractice complaint that would 
give rise to federal jurisdiction.473
The presumably “substantial” but not “disputed” question of patent law 
of inequitable conduct having been once and for all determined thus 
eliminated any further basis for federal jurisdiction.474  The malpractice 
case would have to proceed in state court under that determination to 
resolve whether the plaintiff Magnetek could establish all elements of its 
malpractice case accordingly.475  The court did not consider that 
Kirkland was prejudiced by the fact that the Osram case was decided 
after the arbitration because the law of inequitable conduct was the same 
at both times.476
Other courts that have either refused to follow or have 
distinguished Air Measurement and Immunnocept are detailed in the 
Appendix.  
 472. Id. at 818 (citations omitted). 
 473. Id. at 819 (citing Lab. Corp. IV, 599 F.3d 1277, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted)). 
 474. Magnetek, 924 N.E.2d at 810. 
 475. Id. at 819. 
 476. Id. at 820. 
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C. Summary 
Most courts, federal and state, appear to accept the jurisdictional 
scope of Air Measurement and Immunocept and apply the case-within-a-
case methodology in resolving the jurisdictional question of whether a 
significant question of patent law is raised within the elements of the 
malpractice case.  It also appears that malpractice plaintiffs prefer state 
jurisdiction, while defendant patent attorney prefer federal jurisdiction.  
Conventional wisdom might suggest that plaintiffs perceive that state 
courts provide a local advantage and judges familiar with handling 
malpractice cases, while defendant attorneys may perceive it to be 
advantageous to be in the more familiar federal court system and also to 
rely upon the expertise in patent matters of the federal courts, 
particularly appeals to the Federal Circuit.  Presumably, the federal 
district courts that seem to reject or severely limit Air 
Measurement/Immunocept will be brought into line as seen in Warrior
Sports and what may be expected in the Fifth Circuit under USPPS.
Also, it may be expected that decisions like that of the Nebraska 
Supreme Court in the New Tek cases may be blunted by defendant patent 
attorneys using the removal process to federal district courts, presuming 
these courts will be receptive to removal. 
III. OTHER JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES BEYOND CASE-WITHIN-A-CASE
There are a number of issues relating to jurisdiction in patent 
attorney malpractice cases that are beyond the scope of this article and 
will have to wait for further developments.  These include:  how should 
a “claim” in a complaint as the basis for federal jurisdiction be defined 
as contrasted to a “theory” underlying the claim;477 when, if ever, should 
a defense raising a substantial question of patent law justify the grant of 
 477. See, e.g., Eddings v. Glast, Phillips & Murray, Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-1512-L, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48589 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2008) (if the malpractice plaintiff can recover on any 
theory not involving patent law, no federal jurisdiction); Danner, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, No. 
CV 09-1220-JE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63590 (D. Or. June 23, 2010) (remanded malpractice case 
to state court distinguishing Davis as only involving one claim and at least one of the theories did 
not involve patent law).  Compare Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355, 1359-60 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (broadly defining “claims” and finding federal jurisdiction on one claim raising 
substantial question of patent law and assuming supplemental jurisdiction over claim of failure to 
file PCT applications) with Clearplay, Inc. v. Max Abecassis, 602 F.3d 1364 (Fed Cir. 2010) 
(finding no jurisdiction because none of claims required patent law to resolve) (see text 
accompanying notes 233-44).  See also Revolutionary Concepts, Inc. v. Clements Walker PLLC, 
2010 NCBC 4 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2010) (malpractice plaintiff permitted to voluntarily dismiss claim 
involving question of patent law to retain state jurisdiction). 
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federal jurisdiction;478 should federal jurisdiction be granted in 
malpractice cases involving foreign or PCT applications or patents;479
what is the impact of 28 U.S.C. § 1447 on the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisdiction;480 how should the statute of limitations be applied;481
 478. See, for example, E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. Moses & Singer, LLP, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 516 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2010), in which a plaintiff’s malpractice claim was that defendant patent attorneys were 
negligent in advising it to file infringement suits.  Defendants argued that the state court lacked 
jurisdiction because its defense was that the patents were infringed.  Id. at 520.  The court held that 
plaintiff’s claim was based on the state issue of whether defendants had breached the standard of 
care and the matter of its defense involving patent law did not oust state court jurisdiction.  Id. at 
525-27.  Compare Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump, 504 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 
2007), in which the Federal Circuit stated: 
In addition to proving patent infringement in the “case-within-a-case” context, AMT will 
have to show that it would have prevailed against the defenses the prior litigants raised.  
These are not the sort of jurisdiction-defeating defenses contemplated by Christianson,
486 U.S. at 809, for they are part of the malpractice causation element rather than the 
defenses raised by Akin Gump in the current litigation.   
Id. at 1270.  See discussion supra text accompanying notes 81-127.  It is interesting to note that 
plaintiff E-Pass filed a malpractice action in federal district court after the trial court but before the 
appellate court decision alleging that defendant patent attorneys had “misunderstood and 
misconstrued the [ ]patent in the underlying federal actions.”  E-Pass Techs. v. Moses & Singer, 
LLP, No. C-09-5967 EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128018, at *31 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011).  The 
district court refused to dismiss the action on diversity grounds but also maintained subject matter 
jurisdiction on the basis of the allegation, citing Air Measurement.  Id. at *30-31. 
 479. See, e.g., Antiballistic Sec. & Prot., Inc. v. Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & 
Berkowitz, P.C., 789 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2011) (no federal question as alleged malpractice was 
not filing Canadian patent applications; U.S. patents had issued); Davis, 596 F.3d at 1357 (one 
claim was for failure to file PCT applications and a second claim was for failure to properly file 
U.S. applications).  See also Revolutionary Concepts, 2010 NCBC 4  (“Where the issues involve 
foreign patent rights and issues of whether a lawyer complied with a standard of care, federal 
jurisdiction is not mandated.”). 
 480. See Arc Products, L.L.C. v. Kelly, 424 Fed. App’x 944, 946 (Fed. Cir. 2011), dismissing 
appeal in No. 4:10-CV-1248 CEJ, 2010 WL 4363427 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2010) and Genelink 
Biosciences, Inc. v. Colby, 423 Fed. App’x 977, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2011), dismissing appeal in CIVIL 
NO. 09-5573(NLH)(AMD), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66177 (D.N.J. July 1, 2010).  In both district 
court cases, defendant attorneys had moved to remove the malpractice case to federal court and the 
malpractice plaintiffs moved to remand to state court.  Both district courts granted the remand on 
the basis that there was no federal jurisdiction.  Defendants appealed to the Federal Circuit, with the 
opinions being issued on the same day by the same panel.  Although indicating that the district 
court’s ruling in the New Jersey case “appears contrary to this court’s precedent,” the Federal 
Circuit in Arc Products held that:  “We have no authority to reverse or affirm the merits of the 
court’s decision beyond a determination of the court’s characterization of its remand as resting upon 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction” according to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which states: “An order 
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or 
otherwise. . . . ”  Arc Products, 424 Fed. App’x at 946.  The same result was reached in Genelink
Biosciences, 423 Fed. App’x at 978.  See Scott F. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 
CATH. U. L. REV. 609 (2004); Rhonda Wasserman, Rethinking Review of Remands:  Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Removal Statute, 43 EMORY L.J. 83 (1994); see also Thomas C. 
Goodhue, Note, Appellate Review of Remand Orders:  A Substantive/Jurisdictional Conundrum, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 1319 (2006). 
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should the broad federal jurisdictional sweep of Air 
Measurement/Immunocept be extended to malpractice involving 
copyright, trademark or other forms of intellectual property law?482
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The case-within-a-case methodology would appear to provide a 
workable methodology for resolving the federal or state jurisdictional 
issue in malpractice cases involving patent attorneys.  In the paradigm 
negligence case, a substantial question of patent law can arise with 
respect to any of the elements of the case—duty, breach, causation, or 
damages.  The same is true with respect to malpractice cases based on 
other state-based theories of malpractice, including breach of fiduciary 
duty, breach of contract, or fraud.  Federal jurisdiction should not be 
limited to cases where malpractice plaintiffs are claiming the loss of a 
favorable judgment in the underlying case (the judgment model).  To 
avoid this limitation, a broader definition of “underlying case” should be 
recognized to expend beyond litigation to any “controversy” (the non-
judgment model), raising a significant question of patent law in any 
element of the malpractice case.  Reference to the judgment/non-
judgment models may avoid the complications raised in Air 
Measurement of the “case-within-a-case-within-a-case,” where federal 
jurisdiction according to the Federal Circuit required the malpractice 
plaintiff to establish that it would have obtained a judgment of 
infringement in an infringement suit that had been settled, while 
claiming damages in the malpractice based upon “diminished settlement 
value.”   
While the case-within-a-case methodology may be workable, it 
appears clear from a review of the post Air Measurement/Immunocept
cases that malpractice plaintiffs prefer state courts and defendant patent 
 481. The statute of limitations may provide an obstacle to recovery by malpractice plaintiffs 
who file in either state or federal district courts and have their cases dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2010) (plaintiff filed in state court, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction) (discussed supra
text accompanying notes 407-28).  
 482. Compare Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. Tex. 2008) (no federal 
jurisdiction in malpractice case involving trademarks) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 
327-34), with Harness, Dickey & Pierce, P.L.C, v. Powerhouse Marks, LLC, Case numbers 08-
10292&08-10484, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78561(E.D. Mich, Sept. 29, 2008) (federal jurisdiction in 
trademark malpractice case).  Compare James H. Anderson, Inc. v. Johnson, No. 08 CV 6202, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65001 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2009) (copyright malpractice case that follows Singh no 
federal jurisdiction), with Katz v. Holland & Knight LLP, No. 1:08cv1137, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10721 (E.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2009) (federal jurisdiction in copyright malpractice case).  
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attorneys prefer federal courts, thus requiring resolution of the 
jurisdiction issue in many cases by the lower court (state or federal 
district), leading, of course, to many appeals.  Whether the jurisdictional 
advantages perceived by the parties are worth the additional time and 
expense cannot be determined by reading the cases; however, both 
parties run the risk of having an appeals court ruling that the trial court, 
and hence the appellate court, did not have subject matter jurisdiction, 
and there is the potential problem of the statute of limitations.  Thus, 
careful consideration must be given by both sides in patent attorney 
malpractice cases to subject matter jurisdiction beyond perceived (real or 
imagined) jurisdictional advantages. 
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